Wagner Group

From Wikipedia the free encyclopedia

Wagner Group
Группа Вагнера
Dates of operation2014–present[1]
  • 1,000 (March 2016)[2]
  • 6,000 (December 2017)[3]
Battles and warsCrimean Crisis[4][5]

War in Donbas

Syrian civil war

Sudanese Civil War (military training and security only)[20]
CAR Civil War[21][22][23]
Second Libyan Civil War[24][25][26]

Sudanese Revolution[28]
2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis (security only)[29]

Insurgency in Cabo Delgado[30]

The Wagner Group (Russian: Группа Вагнера, romanizedGruppa Vagnera), also known as PMC Wagner, ChVK Wagner (ChVK being the Russian abbreviation for Private Military Company[31]), or CHVK Vagner (ЧВК Вагнера ChVK Vagnera, Частная Военная Компания Вагнера), is a Russian paramilitary organization. Some have described it as a private military company (or private military contracting agency), whose contractors have reportedly taken part in various conflicts, including operations in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Syrian government as well as, from 2014 until 2015, in the war in Donbas in Ukraine aiding the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.

Others, including reports in The New York Times, are of the opinion that ChVK Wagner is an arms-length unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and/or the GRU[32] in disguise, which is used by the Russian government in conflicts where deniability is called for, as its forces are trained on MoD installations. It is believed to be owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman with close links to Russian President Vladimir Putin.


The founder of the company is reported to be Dmitriy Valeryevich Utkin, who was born in the Siberian city of Asbest, Sverdlovsk Oblast of the Russian SFSR, Soviet Union.[33][34] Utkin is a veteran of the First and Second Chechen War.[35]

Until 2008[35] or 2013, Utkin was a lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of a Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces unit (the 700th Independent Spetsnaz Detachment of the 2nd Independent Brigade) of Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).[36][1][37] After leaving the military, he began working in 2013 for the Moran Security Group, a private company founded by Russian military veterans, involved in security and training missions around the world, and specializing in security against piracy. The same year, senior Moran Security Group managers were involved in setting up the Hong Kong-based[38] Slavonic Corps, which headhunted contractors to "protect oil fields and pipelines" in Syria.[1] Utkin was in Syria as part of the Slavonic Corps and survived its disastrous mission.[36] Subsequently, Russia's Federal Security Service arrested some members of the Slavonic Corps for illegal mercenary activity.[39]

The Wagner Group itself first showed up in 2014,[1] along with Utkin, in the Luhansk region of Ukraine.[36] The company's name comes from Utkin's own call sign ("Wagner"), which he allegedly chose due to his admiration for the Third Reich.[40] Radio Liberty cited insiders as saying that the leadership of the Wagner Group are followers of the Slavic Native Faith (a modern Pagan new religious movement).[41] In August 2017, the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak speculated that Utkin was possibly just a figurehead for the company, while the real head of Wagner was someone else.[42]

In December 2016, Utkin was photographed with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a Kremlin reception given in honour of those who had been awarded the Order of Courage and the title Hero of the Russian Federation (to mark the Day of Heroes of the Fatherland [ru]), along with Alexander Kuznetsov, Andrey Bogatov and Andrey Troshev.[43] Kuznetsov (call sign "Ratibor") was said to be the commander of Wagner's first reconnaissance and assault company, Bogatov was the commander of the fourth reconnaissance and assault company, and Troshev served as the company's "executive director".[44]

A few days after, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed the presence of Utkin at the reception, stating that Utkin was from the Novgorod Region and had received the award, but could not say for what except that it was presumably for courage. Peskov stated he was not aware how famous Utkin was.[45][46]


In early 2016, Wagner had 1,000 employees,[2] which later rose to 5,000 by August 2017,[47] and 6,000 by December 2017.[3] The organization was said to be registered in Argentina[2][47] and also has offices in Saint Petersburg[48] and Hong Kong.[49]

The company trains its personnel at a Russian MoD facility Molkino (Молькино)[37][50] near the village of Molkin, Krasnodar Krai.[51][52][53] The barracks at the base are not linked to the Russian MoD in court documents, in which they are described as a children's vacation camp.[54] According to a report published by Russian monthly Sovershenno Sekretno, the organisation that hired personnel for Wagner did not have a permanent name and had a legal address near the military settlement Pavshino in Krasnogorsk, near Moscow.[55]

The pay of Wagner private military contractors (PMCs), who are usually retired regular Russian servicemen aged between 35 and 55,[42] is estimated to be between 80,000 and 250,000 Russian rubles a month.[56] One source stated the pay was as high as 300,000.[43]

When new PMC recruits arrive at the training camp, they are no longer allowed to use social network services and other Internet resources. Company employees are not allowed to post photos, texts, audio and video recordings or any other information on the Internet that was obtained during their training. They are also not allowed to tell anyone their location, whether they are in Russia or another country. Mobile phones, tablets and other means of communication are left with the company and issued at a certain time with the permission of their commander. Passports and other documents are surrendered and in return company employees receive a nameless dog tag with a personal number. The company only accepts new recruits if a 10-year confidentiality agreement is established and in case of a breach of the confidentiality the company reserves the right to terminate the employee's contract without paying a fee.[57] According to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Russian military officers are assigned the role of drill instructors for the recruits.[58] During their training, the PMCs receive $1,100 dollars per month.[42]

Wagner is believed to have a Serb unit, which was, until at least April 2016, under the command of Davor Savičić, a Bosnian Serb[8] who was a member of the Serb Volunteer Guard (also known as Arkan's Tigers) during the Bosnian War and the Special Operations Unit (JSO) during the Kosovo War.[59][60] His call sign in Bosnia was "Elvis".[60] Savičić was reportedly only three days in the Luhansk region when a BTR armored personnel carrier fired at his checkpoint, leaving him shell-shocked. After this, he left to be treated.[8] He was also reported to had been involved in the first offensive to capture Palmyra from the Islamic State (ISIL) in early 2016.[59] One member of the Serbian unit was killed in Syria in June 2017,[61] while the SBU issued arrest warrants in December 2017, for six Serbian PMCs that belonged to Wagner and fought in Ukraine, including Savičić.[62] In early February 2018, the SBU reported that one Serb member of Wagner, who was a veteran of the conflict in Syria, had been killed while fighting in eastern Ukraine.[63][64]

In early October 2017, the SBU said that Wagner's funding in 2017 had been increased by 185 million roubles ($3.1 million) and that around forty Ukrainian nationals were working for Wagner, with the remaining 95 percent of the personnel being Russian citizens.[65] One Ukrainian was killed in Syria while fighting in the ranks of Wagner in March 2016,[66] and three were reported overall to had died that spring.[67] Armenians, Kazakhs and Moldovans have also worked for Wagner.[68]

It has been reported that Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, sometimes called “Putin's chef”, because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Vladimir Putin attended with foreign dignitaries,[69][70][71] has links with Wagner[72][73] and Dmitry Utkin personally.[74][75] The businessman has been said to be the funder[76] and actual owner of the Wagner Group.[77][78]

Prigozhin, who was sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury in December 2016 for Russia's involvement in the Ukraine conflict,[79][80] denied any communication with Wagner.[81] The US Department of the Treasury also imposed sanctions on the Wagner Group and Utkin personally in June 2017.[82] The designation of the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control listed the company and Dmitriy Utkin under the "Designations of Ukrainian Separatists (E.O. 13660)" heading and referred to him as "the founder and leader of PMC Wagner".[83] Further sanctions were implemented against the Wagner Group in September 2018,[84][85][86] and July 2020.[87] Prigozin was also sanctioned by the European Union and the United Kingdom in October 2020 for links to Wagner activities in Libya.[88]

In late 2019, a so-called Wagner code of honor was revealed that lists ten commandments for Wagner's PMCs to follow. These include, among others, to protect the interests of Russia always and everywhere, to value the honor of a Russian soldier, to fight not for money, but from the principle of winning always and everywhere.[89][90]

Following the deployment of its contractors between 2017 and 2019, to Sudan,[20] the Central African Republic,[21] Madagascar,[91] Libya[27] and Mozambique,[30] the Wagner Group had offices in 20 African countries, including Eswatini, Lesotho and Botswana, by the end of 2019.[92] Early in 2020, Erik Prince, founder of the Blackwater private military company, sought to provide military services to the Wagner Group in its operations in Libya and Mozambique, according to The Intercept.[93] By March 2021, Wagner PMCs were reportedly also deployed in Zimbabwe, Angola, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and possibly the Democratic Republic of Congo.[94]

In 2019, as the presence of Wagner PMCs in Africa was growing, a planned trip by Dmitry Utkin to Rwanda was reportedly cancelled at the last moment. He was supposed to travel with Valery Zakharov, a Russian security advisor to the President of the Central African Republic. Subsequently, it was thought that Dmitry Utkin was withdrawn from the Wagner Group's African operations due to his over-exposure that was the result of the medal-awarding ceremony at the Kremlin in 2016, and the United States sanctions imposed on him. Subsequently, Colonel Konstantin Aleksandrovich Pikalov (call sign "Mazay") was said to have been put in charge of Wagner's African operations.[35] According to another report, there was a change in leadership in the Wagner Group due to changes in the methodology and vector of its work, with Dmitry Utkin leaving the group and Konstantin Pikalov becoming the new head of the organization. Another theory was that Dmitry Utkin may have been be killed as his phone number was no longer functioning and his regular trips from Krasnodar to St. Petersburg stopped.[95]

Pikalov served as a military officer in Russia's experimental military unit 99795, located in the village of Storozhevo near St. Peterburg, which was tasked, in part, with “determining the effects of radioactive rays on living organisms”. Following his retirement, he continued to live on the military base at least until 2012, and ran a private detective agency. In the autumn of 2014, along with a large group of Cossacks, he possibly took part in suppressing opponents of the Russian-supported President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik during the Republika Srpska general election in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dodik won the re-election. Between 2014 and 2017, Pikalov traveled several times to destinations near the Ukrainian border, sometimes on joint bookings with known Wagner officers. In 2016, he ran for office in local council elections in the district of his military base near St. Petersburg on behalf of the pro-Kremlin A Just Russia party. However, his participation was denied by Russia's Central Election Committee, possibly due to his criminal record, as his name is listed in a Central Bank blacklist with a note that he was “a suspect in money laundering”, although his current criminal file is blank. According to Bellingcat, this could mean either that the suspicion did not result in criminal charges, or that the records were purged. Former employees of Prigozhin's interviewed on the condition of anonymity by Bellingcat stated Pikalov was known to have taken part in military operations in both Ukraine and Syria.[35]


Russian and some Western observers, as well as a few people who have been personally involved with the Wagner Group, believe that the organization does not actually exist as a private military company and is but a myth created by Russian propaganda. They believe it is in reality a disguised branch of the Russian MoD that ultimately reports to the Russian government.[96][97][98][99][100][101][102][103]

Private military companies are not legally allowed in Russia; nevertheless a number of them appear to have been operating in Russia, and in April 2012 Vladimir Putin, then Russian prime minister, speaking in the State Duma endorsed an idea of setting up PMCs in Russia.[104] Several military analysts described Wagner as a "pseudo-private" military company that offers the Russian military establishment certain advantages such as ensuring plausible deniability, public secrecy about Russia's military operations abroad, as well as about the number of losses.[105][104][106] Thus, Wagner contractors have been described as "ghost soldiers", due to the Russian government not officially acknowledging them.[107]

In March 2017, Radio Liberty characterized the ChVK Wagner as a "semi-legal militant formation that exists under the wing and on the funds of the Ministry of Defence".[108] In September 2017, the chief of Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) Vasyl Hrytsak said that in their opinion Wagner was in essence "a private army of Putin" and that the SBU were "working on identifying these people, members of Wagner PMC, to make this information public so that our partners in Europe knew them personally".[109][110] The Wagner Group has also been compared with Academi, the American security firm formerly known as Blackwater.[111]

The SBU alleged that Wagner employees were issued international passports in bulk by the GRU via Central Migration Office Unit 770–001 in the second half of 2018, allegations partially verified by Bellingcat.[112][113]

In an interview in December 2018, Russian President Putin said, in regard to Wagner PMCs operating in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere, that "everyone should remain within the legal framework" and that if the Wagner group was violating the law, the Russian Prosecutor General's Office "should provide a legal assessment". But, according to Putin, if they did not violate Russian law, they had the right to work and promote their business interests abroad. The president also denied allegations that Yevgeny Prigozhin had been directing Wagner's activities.[114]


Crimea and Eastern Ukraine[edit]

Wagner PMCs first showed up in February 2014 in Crimea[4][5] during Russia's 2014 annexation of the peninsula where they operated in line with regular Russian army units, disarmed the Ukrainian Army and took control over facilities. The takeover of Crimea was almost bloodless.[115] The PMCs, along with the regular soldiers, were called "polite people" at the time[116] due to their well-mannered behavior. They kept to themselves, carried weapons that were not loaded, and mostly made no effort to interfere with civilian life.[117] Another name for them was "little green men" since they were masked, wearing unmarked green army uniforms and their origin was initially unknown.[118]

After the takeover of Crimea,[115] some 300 PMCs[119] went to the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine where a conflict started between Ukrainian government and pro-Russian forces. Thanks to their help, the pro-Russian forces were able to destabilize government security forces in the region, immobilize operations of local government institutions, seize ammunition storages and take control of towns.[115] The PMCs conducted sneak attacks, reconnaissance, intelligence-gathering and accompanied VIPs.[120] In October 2017, the Ukrainian SBU claimed it had established the involvement of the Wagner Group in the June 2014 Il-76 airplane shoot-down at Luhansk International Airport that killed 40 Ukrainian paratroopers, as well as a crew of nine.[6] Russian and Serbian "mercenaries" were already reported being involved in the summer 2014 battle for the airport, although it was not stated if they were linked to Wagner back then.[121][122]

According to the SBU, Wagner PMCs were initially deployed to eastern Ukraine on 21 May 2014, and the service was planning to file charges on Dmitry Utkin to the office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine.[65] The PMCs also participated in the early 2015 Battle of Debaltseve, which involved one of the heaviest artillery bombardments in recent history, as well as reportedly hundreds of regular Russian soldiers.[2] The PMCs were supported by several KAMAZ-43269 "Vystrel" MRAPs.[123] During fighting near the town, their logistics platoon was reported to had extracted several destroyed KAMAZ-43269 "Dozor" MRAPs belonging to the Russian military, during which the platoon's commander was wounded.[124] Several PMCs were killed during the clashes.[8][125] The battle for Debaltseve ended in a decisive victory over Ukrainian forces.[2] According to a Wagner PMC, Dmitry Utkin himself was wounded during the deployment to Ukraine, getting a splinter in his liver.[126]

Following the end of major combat operations, the PMCs were reportedly given the assignment to kill dissident pro-Russian commanders that were acting in a rebellious manner, according to the Russian nationalist Sputnik and Pogrom [ru] internet media outlet and the SBU.[106][115] According to Sputnik and Pogrom, in one raid, they killed more than 10 militia fighters.[115] In another operation in early January 2015, the PMCs disarmed without any loss of life the Odessa brigade of the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR), after surrounding their base in Krasnodon with the support of tanks and artillery, and demanding the separatists disarm and return to their homes.[127]

According to the SBU and the Russian news site Fontanka [ru], Wagner also forced the reorganization and disarmament of Russian Cossack and other formations.[120][128] The PMCs acted mostly in the LPR,[115] for whose authorities they allegedly conducted four political killings of separatist commanders.[5][115] The killed commanders were in a conflict with the LPR's president, Igor Plotnitsky.[120][129] The LPR accused Ukraine of committing the assassinations,[129][130] while unit members of the commanders believed it was the LPR authorities who were behind the killings.[130][131][132]

In late November 2017, the SBU published what they said were intercepted audio recordings that proved a direct link between Dmitry Utkin and Igor Cornet, the Interior Minister of the LPR, who was stated to had personally led the initiative of eliminating the dissident commanders.[133] In early June 2018, the SBU also published telephone conversations between Utkin and Igor Plotnitsky from January 2015, as well as conversations between Utkin and Russian GRU officer Oleg Ivannikov who was using the pseudonym Andrei Ivanovich. Ivannikov, according to a Wagner PMC, supervised both their forces, as well as that of the LPR separatists, during the fighting in 2014 and 2015.[123] Wagner left Ukraine and returned to Russia in autumn of 2015, with the start of the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War.[5]


Arrival and capture of Palmyra and al-Shaer[edit]

The presence of the PMCs in Syria was first reported in late October 2015, almost a month after the start of the Russian military intervention in the country's civil war, when between three and nine PMCs were killed in a rebel mortar attack on their position in Latakia province.[9][134][135] It was reported that the Wagner Group was employed by the Russian Defense Ministry, even though private military companies are illegal in Russia.[56] The Russian Defense Ministry dismissed the early reports by The Wall Street Journal about the Wagner Group's operations in Syria as an "information attack". However, sources within the Russian FSB and the Defense Ministry unofficially stated for RBTH that Wagner was supervised by the GRU.[52]

Furthermore, according to a few Wagner fighters, they were flown to Syria aboard Russian military transport planes.[4] Others were transported to Syria by the Syrian Cham Wings airline from the Rostov-on-Don Airport, with 51 round trips being made between January 2017 and March 2018.[136] Their equipment was delivered to Syria via the so-called Syrian Express [ru],[137] a fleet of Russian military and civilian merchant ships that had been delivering supplies to Syria since 2012.[138] Later, a Defense Ministry source told RBK TV that the FSB was also directing the PMCs.[137] The usage of Wagner had reportedly cost Russia 170 million dollars by August 2016.[139]

By July 2017, according to The New York Times, the Kremlin established a policy in Syria where companies that seize oil and gas wells, as well as mines, from ISIL forces would get oil and mining rights for those same sites. Two Russian companies received contracts under this policy by this time, with one employing the Wagner Group to secure those sites from the militants.[82] Later, it was revealed that the company would receive 25 percent of the proceeds from oil and gas production at fields its PMCs captured and secured from ISIL.[69] Some reports stated that the contracts with Damascus were established after Wagner lost the trust and financing of the Russian Defense Ministry in early 2016.[140] As of early August 2017, the number of Wagner employees in Syria was reported to had reached 5,000, after the arrival of an additional 2,000 PMCs, including Chechens and Ingush.[42]

Wagner PMCs were involved in both Palmyra offensives in 2016 and 2017, as well as the Syrian Army's campaign in central Syria in the summer of 2017 and the Battle of Deir ez-Zor in late 2017.[8][11][141][13] They were in the role of frontline advisors, fire and movement coordinators[106] and forward air controllers who provided guidance to close air support.[142] When they arrived in Syria the PMCs received T-72 tanks, BM-21 Grad MLRs and 122 mm D-30 howitzers.[143] During the first Palmyra offensive, according to one of the contractors, the PMCs were used as "cannon fodder" and most of the work was conducted by them, with the regular Syrian Army, who he described as "chickens", only finishing the job.[4] An expert on Russian security at the IIR, Mark Galeotti, said they served as "shock troops" alongside the Syrian Army.[105]

Following the successful conclusion of the offensive, during which 32 of the contractors were reportedly killed and about 80 wounded, the PMCs were withdrawn between April and May 2016, and they surrendered all of their heavy weapons and military equipment. When they returned for the second Palmyra offensive and to capture ISIL-held oil fields at the beginning of 2017, the PMCs reportedly faced a shortage of weapons and equipment as they were issued only older assault rifles, machine guns, T-62 tanks and M-30 howitzers. Several sniper rifles and grenade launchers were delivered a few weeks later, which did not solve the issue.

According to Fontanka, the equipment problems in combination with a reported reduction in the quality of its personnel led to Wagner suffering a significantly higher number of casualties in the second battle for Palmyra than the first one. Between 40 and 60 were reported killed and between 80 and 180 were wounded.[143] The Russian investigative blogger group[144] the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) attributed the higher losses mainly to ISIL's heavy use of suicide-bombers and the militant group's unwillingness to negotiate.[11] Still, the second offensive also ended in a victory for pro-government forces.[145][146]

Besides fighting ISIL militants, according to RBK TV, the PMCs trained a Syrian Army unit called the ISIS Hunters [fr], which was also fully funded and trained by Russian special forces.[147] The ISIS Hunters were one of the leading units[148] during the capture of the al-Shaer gas fields from ISIL in late April 2017.[149] However, as of the beginning of July, the PMCs were still fighting to secure the al-Shaer gas fields and the areas of the phosphate mines.[150] Still, in mid-September, the al-Shaer gas fields started getting back into production.[151] Subsequently, the PMCs were in charge of guarding the refineries, with ISIL occasionally making attempts to retake the fields, each time being beaten back. During one attack, a PMC was tortured to death by ISIL.[152]

Killing of Muhammad Abdullah al-Ismail[edit]

In early July 2017, a video emerged that showed Wagner PMCs bludgeoning a man who was initially believed to be a captured ISIL militant in the Palmyra area, with the person being beheaded after.[150]

More than two years later, full footage was uploaded to a closed VKontakte group for members of Wagner with new information asserting that the killed person was a Syrian Army soldier who had deserted.[153][154] The contractors also accused the man, named as Muhammad "Hamadi" Abdullah al-Ismail (or Mohammed Taha Ismail Al-Abdullah) from Deir ez-Zor, of being a jihadist for wanting to desert. Ismail had fled Syria earlier in the war for Lebanon, before returning in 2017, after which he was arrested and forcibly conscripted into the Syrian military.[155] After he was killed, his body was mutilated and burned.[156] In the video of the killing, a second severed head of an unidentified person could be seen lying on the ground.[157]

A Russian independent media report identified one of the perpetrators as Stanislav Yevgenyevich Dychko,[158] a confirmed operative of the Wagner Group[153][154] who previously worked for the Russian Interior Ministry.[158] A second one was identified as a former soldier named Ruslan from Bryansk, currently employed as a "patriotic educator" in local schools.[159] Arab media also established the place of the murder to be the al-Shaer oilfield near Homs.[160] Further investigation by Russian media in December 2019 identified the remaining perpetrators as Vladimir B., Dzhakhongyr M. ("Pamir"), Ruslan ("Chichi") and Vladislav Apostol, who was killed in Syria in February 2018.[161] The Novaya Gazeta newspaper sent the material from its investigation into the killing to the office of the Prosecutor General of Russia, as well as the Investigative Committee of Russia, however no criminal cases were opened as a result.[162]

In March 2021, human rights lawyers from three nongovernmental organizations representing the killed person's brother filed a lawsuit in Moscow against six Wagner Group PMCs accused of the killing.[163][164]

Push into Deir ez-Zor and clearing of Hama[edit]

In mid-September 2017, the PMCs helped Syrian troops[165] to capture the town of Uqayribat from ISIL in the central Hama province.[166][167] Several PMCs were killed during the fighting for the town and their bodies were seized by the militants.[141] One week later, the PMCs, along with regular Russian troops, supported Syrian government forces in repelling a HTS-led rebel offensive north of Hama.[12] At the end of that month, during an ISIL counter-offensive in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, two Wagner PMCs were captured by the militants.[168][43] Initially, the Kremlin attempted to distance itself from the two,[169] while a brother of one of them accused the Russian government of rejecting them.[170]

Subsequently, the Syrian ISIS Hunters unit pledged to pay one million dollars for the release of each of the captive Russians. However, the ISIS Hunters also said they would execute 100 captive militants for each of the Russians if they were killed by the jihadists.[171] At the same time, a Russian parliamentary official stated that the two had almost certainly been executed, presumably for refusing to reject their Christian Orthodox religion, reject Russia, become Muslims and join the militant group.[172][173] This claim was questioned by the CIT, who pointed out that there had been no reports to this effect from the militants' sources.[51]

In late October 2017, a video emerged on YouTube glorifying the PMCs actions in Syria.[174] Between the end of October and the start of November, Wagner took part in the Battle of Deir ez-Zor[13] where they cleared the remaining ISIL militants from the districts of Al-Rashidiyah and Al-Ardi, as well as the Al-Bazh and Abu-Adad neighborhoods, along with the Syrian Army.[14] Three or four companies of Wagner PMCs were involved in the fighting.[165] Syrian government forces took complete control of the city by 3 November.[175][176] A besieged pocket of ISIL militants remained on an island in the city's outskirts, which soon came under attack.[177] As government forces advanced, the pro-opposition SOHR reported that Russia demanded the release of the two captive PMCs during negotiations with the trapped militants.[178]

On 17 November, the last ISIL fighters on the island had surrendered, leaving the Syrian Army in control of all territory surrounding Deir ez-Zor city.[179][180] However, the two PMCs were still prisoners. At the end of November, it was reported that the Russian military was negotiating for the release of the two PMCs who were reportedly being held on the border of Syria and Iraq.[181] However, on 4 December, the ISIS Hunters reported they had killed the commander of the ISIL militants that had captured and executed the two PMCs.[182] The same day, a Wagner representative notified the parents of one of the two that both had died in captivity.[183]

At the end of November, Russia announced plans to withdraw some of its troops from Syria by the end of the year. It was reported that to avoid potential security losses, Russia would fill the void with private military companies, including Wagner.[184] On 11 December, Putin declared victory against "terrorists" during a visit to Russia's Khmeimim air base in Syria.[185]

Ruslan Pukhov, the director of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies think tank, stated the usage of PMCs was one of the factors that contributed to Russia's victory in Syria. He pointed out that Russia managed to remove the need for deploying large numbers of ground forces by bringing in the Russian PMCs who, unlike American PMCs who were usually only in support roles, were used as highly capable assault troops and that they were often embedded with Syrian units to augment their fighting ability. He also pointed out that the Russian public proved completely indifferent to the losses suffered by the PMCs, rightly believing that "these people are highly paid, and knew what they were getting into".[186]

In December 2017, the PMCs took part in the Syrian Army's offensive into Idlib province against mostly HTS rebel forces.[15] As part of the same campaign in the northwest of Syria, in early February 2018, the PMCs helped in the capture of several villages in the northeastern countryside of Hama from IS.[187] Between 3 and 7 February, pro-government forces seized at least 25 villages,[188] shrinking the IS pocket in that part of the country by a reported 80 percent.[189] The pocket was cleared on 9 February.[190]

Battle of Khasham[edit]

At about 10 p.m., local time, on 7 February 2018, a battle began near the Syrian town of Khasham in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, between pro-Syrian government forces and the Kurdish-led SDF, supported by the U.S. military. During the clashes, U.S. aircraft conducted air-strikes against Syrian troops, leaving between 45 and 100 government fighters dead.[191][192]

A Russian newspaper, citing Russian military and contractor sources, reported pro-government forces were attempting to capture the Conoco (locally called Al Tabiyeh) gas field from the SDF.[193][194] According to two U.S. defense officials, the U.S. military assessed that Russian PMCs also participated in the assault, with one saying some of the contractors had been killed in the air-strikes.[195] A Kurdish militia commander and an ex-Russian officer also claimed Russian contractors suffered casualties during the fighting.[195][196]

On 19 February 2018, a publication by the Ukraine-based Inform Napalm alleged the battle was planned and cleared with the Russian military command by Sergey Kim, the chief of Wagner's operations department and a former Russian Marine officer.[197][198] An official statement by the ISIS Hunters unit stated they had received intelligence that ISIL forces were moving towards Khasham and government forces decided to move from the Euphrates so to cut off ISIL's line of attack. At this point, armed groups were spotted east of Khasham, in SDF-held territory, which then attacked the government's troops. The groups were quickly pushed back. The military claimed that, according to intercepted radio traffic, the groups were partly ISIL and partly Kurds, and retreated towards the Conoco factory. At this point, pro-government units were hit by air-strikes.[199]

According to Germany's Der Spiegel, the ferocious American response was primarily triggered by a unit of Syrian tribal militia and Shiite fighters moving from the town of Al Tabiyeh towards Khasham, concurrently with another group of pro-government forces that had crossed the Euphrates River near the Deir ez-Zor Airport advancing towards Khasham from the village of Marrat. Der Spiegel reported no Russians were in either formation; yet there was a small contingent of Russian PMCs stationed in Al Tabiyeh, who were not participating in the fighting.[200] Similarly, the SOHR activist organization reported that the Russians PMCs, who were accompanying government forces as they advanced towards the SDF-held oil and gas fields, were killed at Al Tabiyeh. Furthermore, the SOHR stated they were not killed in the air-strikes, but instead in a booby-trapped explosion at an arms depot.[201]

Several days after the battle, various Russian groups started confirming a number of Wagner PMCs had been killed in the air-strikes.[16][17] Some posts on Russian social media made claims of over 200 Russian PMCs being killed, although the veracity of this information was questioned[202] and could not be confirmed.[203] A Russian paramilitary chief, critical of the killed contractors, also claimed 218 PMCs were killed and that the families were still waiting for their remains.[204] A Russian military doctor, a leader of a PMC-linked paramilitary Cossack organization, a source with ties to Wagner and the Ukrainian SBU claimed 80–100 PMCs were killed and 100–200 wounded.[205][206] The SBU further named 64 of the PMCs.[207] A Russian journalist believed between 20 and 25 PMCs died in the strikes,[202] while similarly CIT estimated a total of between 20 and 30 had died.[208]

The Novaya Gazeta reported a Russian death toll of 13, while the ataman of the Baltic separate Cossack District, Maxim Buga, stated no more than 15–20 died and that the other estimates were exaggerations.[209] On 19 February, one of Wagner's leaders, Andrey Troshev, was quoted as saying 14 "volunteers" died in the battle.[210][211] Three other Wagner commanders also stated the claim of 200 dead was an exaggeration and that 15 PMCs were killed at the most.[41] Russia officially confirmed five presumably Russian citizens had been killed in the air-strikes.[212] Der Spiegel and the SOHR reported mostly Syrians were killed in the strikes.[200][213]

As of late March, the PMCs remained in the same area and were using local pro-government troops to scout coalition positions.[214] According to former Wagner members, the battle at Khasham had an impact that lead to changes to the organization, with the PMCs subsequently being given only guard duties at the local plants.[215]

Securing of Damascus[edit]

On 18 February 2018, the Syrian military launched an offensive against the rebel-held Eastern Ghouta, east of Damascus,[216][217] and split the region into three separate pockets by 12 March.[218][219]

As of 17 March 82 percent of Eastern Ghouta was captured by the Syrian Army.[220] One of the towns captured by government troops during this time was Mesraba.[221] On 18 March, the rebels launched a counter-attack in an attempt to recapture Mesraba and quickly seized most of the town from government forces. Wagner PMCs then reportedly launched an operation and during the night between 18 and 19 March, fully recaptured Mesraba.

Another mission they were charged with during the offensive was to secure the humanitarian corridor established by the Russian Reconciliation Center for Syria that allowed civilians to leave rebel-held areas for government territory. According to the Center, 79,702 people had left rebel-held parts of Eastern Ghouta as of 19 March.[18] By 23 March, the SOHR put the number of those who left rebel areas or remained in two towns seized by government forces at 120,000, while the UN stated 50,000 had left the besieged areas.[222] The whole Eastern Ghouta region was captured by government forces on 14 April,[223][224][225] effectively ending the near 7-year rebellion near Damascus.[226]

In March, an anonymous senior commander of the Wagner Group was quoted as saying that there were five Wagner companies operating in Syria, as well as The Carpathians (Russian: Карпаты, romanizedKarpaty) company attached to Wagner, manned mainly by Ukrainian citizens.[41] The Carpathians consisted of about 100 fighters.[67] In May, the SBU announced it identified Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Demyanenko of the Russian Armed Forces as the Carpathians' trainer. According to the announcement, the unit was formed to conduct reconnaissance and attacks in Ukraine.[227] Belarusians were also said to be among Wagner's contractors.[228]

Post-major combat[edit]

As of the end of November 2018, the PMCs were conducting very few combat missions. Instead, they were stationed at facilities and it was stated that during the past summer a company trained for three months at a base, 70 kilometers from Deir ez-Zor, for riot control.[229]

At the start of May 2019, it was reported Wagner snipers were being deployed along the Idlib frontline in northwest Syria in anticipation of a Syrian Army offensive.[19] The ground offensive was launched on 6 May, after a week-long aerial campaign against rebel territory,[230] with pro-government troops managing to capture two major towns within three days. Photos and videos appeared to show at least one Russian PMC accompanying Syrian troops into one of the towns.[231] Members of the Russian special forces were also present during the offensive.[232]

In early September, the PMC's were preparing for an offensive to assault the rebel-held city of Idlib. They were grouped into 50-man tank-equipped units supported by Russian air forces. While working with regular Syrian government forces, they were first to establish civilian evacuation corridors and then engage in the attack on the city.[233]

On 15 October 2019, Syrian government forces entered the city of Manbij and its surrounding countryside, as US military forces started a withdrawal from the area,[234] which was completed by the end of the day.[235] Subsequently, the Russian military started patrols between rebel and government-held areas in the Manbij district.[236] It was thought that Wagner PMCs were involved in the taking over of an abandoned US military base in the area, due to the confirmed presence of a Russian journalist who was known to regularly follow the contractors.[237]

In mid-January 2020, tense standoffs started with US troops blocking Russian military vehicles from using the M4 highway in northeastern Syria. Almost half a dozen incidents took place towards the end of the month.[238][239] In early February, vehicles carrying Russian contractors were also blocked by US troops on the highways. According to the US, the incidents took place deep inside territory patrolled by their military and the Kurdish-led SDF.[240]

As of early February, PMCs were posted at the frontline in the Al-Ghab Plain of Hama province.[241] In April, the Wagner-linked Russian security contractor "Evro Polis" delivered 50 ventilators, 10,000 coronavirus test kits, and 2,000 items of protective clothing to Syria amid the coronavirus pandemic.[242] At the end of December 2020, ISIL attacks intensified in eastern Syria, after the PMCs reportedly withdrew from Deir ez-Zor province to Latakia.[243]

Return to Ukraine[edit]

In late November 2017, a power struggle erupted in the separatist Luhansk People's Republic in Eastern Ukraine between LPR president Igor Plotnitsky and the LPR's Interior Minister, Igor Kornet [Wikidata], who Plotnitsky ordered to be dismissed. During the turmoil, armed men in unmarked uniforms took up positions in the center of Luhansk.[244][245] Some of the men allegedly belonged to Wagner.[246] In the end, Plotnitsky resigned and LPR Security Minister Leonid Pasechnik was named acting leader "until the next elections."[247] Plotnitsky reportedly fled to Russia[248] and the LPR's People's Council unanimously approved Plotnitsky's resignation.[249]

In an interview with the Russian news site The Insider in early December 2017, veteran Russian officer Igor Strelkov confirmed that Wagner PMCs had returned to Luhansk from Syria. Strelkov had a key role in the annexation of Crimea by Russia, as well as in the early stages of the war in the east of Ukraine where he was one of the most senior commanders.[250] He was pulled out of eastern Ukraine in August 2014, reportedly because the Russian authorities felt he was too much of a liability,[251] after which he started opposing the Kremlin.[252]

In mid-May 2018, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that about 100 Wagner PMCs could possibly arrive in Donetsk in the coming days so to support the pro-Russian separatist DPR.[253] As of October, a few dozen PMCs remained in the Luhansk region, according to the SBU, to kill any people considered "undesirable by Russia".[254]


In the interview with The Insider, Strelkov additionally said that, besides returning to Luhansk, Wagner PMCs were also present in South Sudan and possibly Libya.[250] Several days before the interview was published, Strelkov stated Wagner PMCs were being prepared to be sent from Syria to Sudan or South Sudan after Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, told Russia's president Putin that his country needed protection "from aggressive actions of the USA".

Two internal-conflicts have been raging in Sudan for years (in the region of Darfur and the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile), while a civil war has been taking place in South Sudan since 2013. The head of the private Russian firm RSB-group said that he heard PMCs had already traveled to Sudan and had returned with a severe form of malaria.[255] Several dozen PMCs from RSB-group were sent to Libya in early 2017, to an industrial facility near the city of Benghazi, in an area held by forces loyal to Field marshal Khalifa Haftar, to support demining operations. They left in February after completing their mission.[256] The RSB-group was in Libya at the request of the Libyan Cement Company (LCC).[257]

In mid-December, a video surfaced showing Wagner PMCs training members of the Sudanese military,[20] thus confirming Wagner's presence in Sudan and not South Sudan.[258] The PMCs were sent to Sudan to support it militarily against South Sudan and protect gold, uranium and diamond mines, according to Sergey Sukhankin, an associate expert at the ICPS and Jamestown Foundation fellow. Sukhankin stated that the protection of the mines was the "most essential commodity" and that the PMCs were sent to "hammer out beneficial conditions for the Russian companies".[259]

The PMCs in Sudan reportedly numbered 300 and were working under the cover of "M Invest", a company linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin.[260] "M Invest" signed a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry for the use of transport aircraft of the 223rd Flight Unit of the Russian Air Force and between April 2018 and February 2019, two aircraft of the 223rd made at least nine flights to the Sudanese capital of Khartoum.[261] The Wagner contractors in Sudan included former Ukrainian citizens who were recruited in Crimea, according to the SBU.[262]

In late January 2019, after protests erupted in Sudan mid-December 2018, the British press made allegations that the PMCs were helping the Sudanese authorities crackdown on the protesters. During the first days of the protests, demonstrators and journalists reported groups of foreigners had gathered near major rallying points. This was denied by the Russian Foreign Ministry,[263][264] although it confirmed contractors were in Sudan to train the Sudanese army.[265] The SBU named 149 PMCs it said participated in the suppression of the protests,[28] as well as two that were reportedly killed in the clashes.[266] Between 30 and 40 people were killed during the protests,[267] including two security personnel. More than 800 protesters were detained.[268] Meanwhile, France accused the PMCs of having a "strong, active presence" on social media and that they were pushing a strong "anti-French rhetoric" in the CAR.[269]

Following Omar al-Bashir's eventual overthrow in a coup d'état on 11 April 2019, Russia continued to support the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that was subsequently established to govern Sudan, as the TMC agreed to uphold Russia's contracts in Sudan's defense, mining and energy sectors. This included the PMCs' training of Sudanese military officers.[270] In May, Russia signed a military agreement with Sudan[271] which, among other things, would facilitate the entry of Russian warships to Sudanese ports.[272] Additionally, a new draft agreement was signed in November 2020, that would lead to the establishing of a Russian naval logistic center and repair yard that on Sudan's Red Sea coast would host up to 300 people. The agreement is expected to stand for 25 years, unless either party objects to its renewal.[273][274]

In April 2020, the Wagner-connected company "Meroe Gold" was reported to be planning to ship personal protective equipment, medicine, and other equipment to Sudan amid the coronavirus pandemic.[242] Three months later, the United States sanctioned the "M Invest" company, as well as its Sudan subsidiary "Meroe Gold" and two individuals key to Wagner operations in Sudan, for the suppression and discrediting of protesters.[87]

Central African Republic[edit]

Delivery of Russian BRDM-2 armored vehicles to Central African Republic, October 2020

In mid-January 2018, it was reported that Wagner may deploy a contingent of its PMCs to the Central African Republic (CAR), as Russia successfully lobbied the UN Security Council to allow it to ship weapons and ammunition to the country,[275] despite an active arms embargo in place since 2013 under Security Council Resolution 2127.[276] Reuters reported that France had offered to transport arms seized in Somalia to the former French colony, but was muscled out of the country by Russia.[277] In late March, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated five Russian soldiers and 170 "civilian instructors" had been sent to the CAR to train its servicemen.[278][279] According to CAR's president, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, the training provided would strengthen the effectiveness of the CAR's armed forces in combating "plunderers". Later, the instructors were indeed confirmed to be Wagner PMCs who were sent to the CAR to protect lucrative mines, support the CAR government[259] and provide close protection for Touadéra.[280]

The role of the PMCs was also to fill a security vacuum left by France after it withdrew its military forces from the country in October 2016.[281] The country had been in the midst of a civil war since 2012, which left three quarters of it under rebel control.[282] The PMCs' camp was set up on 24 March 2018,[280] about 60 kilometers from the capital Bangui at the Berengo estate that was used by CAR's former ruler Jean-Bédel Bokassa.[283] This deployment brought the number of PMCs in Sudan and the CAR to about 370.[259] In April, locals blocked a Russian-registered Cessna from taking off in rebel-held Kaga-Bandoro, which is located near diamond deposits. According to the CAR government, the plane was carrying Russian military advisers who had been there for peace negotiations with the rebels[284] and witnesses stated three or four Russian soldiers from the aircraft visited the compounds of Muslim rebel leaders.[285] This raised suspicions by CIT and the Transparency International INGO that Wagner PMCs were also guarding diamond mines in rebel territory.[284] Several years later, a report to the UN Security Council regarding human rights violations in the CAR noted that the Russian PMCs established themselves in the country's major mining centers.[286]

In late May 2018, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung newspaper reported the number of Russian PMCs in the CAR was 1,400.[281] Jamestown Foundation fellow Sukhankin told Polygraph.info that the Wagner Group was in charge of military operations in the country, while another Russian private military company called Patriot was in charge of protecting VIPs.[287] 10 Russian military instructors were stationed in the lawless town of Bangassou, on the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while another unit was in the key town of Sibut, near rebel-held territory.[282] In early July 2018, the Wagner Group's Col. Konstantin Pikalov arrived in the CAR and was stationed there during that summer. He would once again return to the CAR following the elections in Madagascar later that year, where he also took part as a security consultant for different candidates.[35] According to Bellingcat's Christo Grozev, during his time in the CAR, Pikalov was "a kind of intermediary" between Yevgeny Prigozhin's private companies, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Kremlin.[288]

In August 2018, Russia signed a military cooperation agreement with the CAR,[289] while it also helped broker, along with Sudan, a tentative agreement among armed groups in the country.[290] Three months later, Al Jazeera was given unprecedented access to Russian military instructors in the CAR. While the Al Jazeera crew was filming the Russian-facilitated training for CAR troops, Valery Zakharov, the Russian special advisor to the President of the CAR, stated that the Wagner Group amounts to no more than an "urban legend" and that training in the country was being done by Russian reservists.[291]

In December 2018, the Ukrainian SBU reported that the umbrella structure of Wagner in the CAR is a commercial firm affiliated with Yevgeny Prigozhin – M-Finance LLC Security Service from St. Petersburg, whose main areas of activity are mining of precious stones and private security services. According to the SBU, some of the PMCs were transported to Africa directly on Prigozhin's private aircraft. The SBU reported that they identified 37 Russian citizens who were engaged in the CAR by Russian military intelligence on a rotational basis as members of M-Finance LLC Security Service, whose head was reported to be Valery Zakharov from St. Petersburg. Zakharov was said to be a Wagner PMC himself, whose personal Wagner number was M-5658.[292] Zakharov also acted as a Russian diplomat and security advisor to the CAR's president.[293] However, according to Bellingcat's Grozev, Konstantin Pikalov was the one who was ultimately giving instructions to Zakharov.[288]

Overall, according to information obtained by the Ukrainian SBU, 1,012 Wagner PMCs were airlifted on two Tupolev Tu-154 airliners between August and December 2018, to Sudan, the CAR and other African countries.[294]

Five days before the 2020–21 Central African general election, rebels attacked and captured the CAR's fourth largest city, Bambari. In response, the government requested assistance from Rwanda and Russia as per bilateral agreements. Rwanda bolstered its troops serving in the UN peacekeeping mission in the CAR, while Russia sent an additional 300 military instructors to the country.[295][296][297] Concurrently, Russian and Rwandan "mercenaries" were reportedly deployed along with government troops at the village of Boyali, 130 kilometers northwest of the capital Bangui.[298] The following day, UN and government forces recaptured Bambari.[299] One month later, on 25 January 2021, CAR forces, backed by Russian PMCs and Rwandan troops, attacked Boyali, killing 44 rebels who were plotting an assault on the capital.[23] Subsequently, CAR forces, supported by the Russian contractors and Rwandan troops, captured a number of strategic towns throughout February 2021, including Bossembele, Bouar, Beloko and Bossangoa. As the rebels were being pushed back, Valery Zakharov urged them to hand over their leaders to the CAR's security forces.[300][301][302][303] During the fighting, the rebel Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) claimed its fighters killed several Wagner PMCs and captured one when they destroyed their truck near Bambari on 10 February.[304]

Government advances, with the support of Russian and Rwandan forces, continued during March, April and May 2021.[305][306][307][308][309] This included the capture of the strategic towns of Bria and Kaga-Bandoro[310][311] and the Bakouma sub-prefecture.[312] Some towns were also seized solely by the Russian PMCs,[313][314][315] including Nzacko.[316] In at least one instance, the contractors reportedly included Syrians.[315] Mid-May, the Russians captured a village about 40 kilometers from Bambari during fighting that left 20 people dead.[317] In addition, at the end of the month, Russian and Syrian PMCs of the Wagner Group attacked a rebel checkpoint at the entrance of a village 28 kilometers from Bria, killing three CPC fighters.[318] Towards the end of July, the CAR military was leaving the frontline against the CPC to the PMCs. The plan was for government troops to occupy the captured positions after they had been secured by the contractors.[319]

At the end of March 2021, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated it received reports of mass executions, arbitrary detentions, torture, forced displacement of civilians, and attacks on humanitarian workers attributable to private military forces allied with the CAR military, including the Wagner Group, as well as to UN peacekeepers in some instances.[320] In one incident, it was reported that a civilian vehicle was fired upon from a checkpoint outside Grimari, allegedly controlled by the Russian PMCs and CAR soldiers, killing four people, including an aid worker. The civilians were fleeing Bambari. Local residents and rights groups also stated that in Boda, west of Bangui, the PMCs occupied two schools since February, blocking around 2,000 children from attending class. Still, overall, more than 85 percent of the nearly 200 rights violations documented that took place between October and December 2020, were attributed to rebel groups, including the CPC.[321] At the end of April, the CAR government received a report by the United Nations, detailing abuses committed by CAR and allied Russian forces between December 2020 and April 2021. The government described the information as "denunciations," but promised to investigate them. The CAR Ministry of Justice issued instructions to set up a "special commission of inquiry" which would bring in the country's three prosecutorial services.[322]

In early May 2021, the CAR government notified the UN Security Council it was requesting 600 new Russian military instructors. According to Russia, the instructors would be unarmed.[323]

At the end of May 2021, Central African Republic government and Russian paramilitary forces, pursued CAR rebels across the border with Chad. The incident left six Chadian soldiers dead. According to the Chadian government, the CAR military pursued rebels over the border into Chad and attacked a Chadian military border post, killing the soldiers. According to Chad, five of the soldiers were killed after being abducted and taken over the border into the CAR. The CAR government denied this and stated the rebels who they were pursuing were responsible.[324] Some Chadian army sources named the Wagner Group as the Russian paramilitary force fighting alongside CAR forces.[325] According to The New York Times, in the CAR the word "Wagner" is colloquially used to refer to Russian involvement in the country.[326]

At the end of June 2021, The New York Times obtained a report given to the UN Security Council which detailed that the Russian PMCs, under the of guise of unarmed military advisers, led government forces during the January–February counter-offensive. According to the report, the PMCs, along with their allied forces, committed violations that "included cases of excessive force, indiscriminate killings, occupation of schools and looting on a large scale, including of humanitarian organizations". The report was said to be based on photographic evidence and confidential testimonies by witnesses and local officials. The report also found that the rebels conducted forcible recruitment of child soldiers, attacks against peacekeepers, looting of aid groups and sexual assaults on women.[286] At the end of October, United Nations experts urged the CAR government to cut ties with private military and security personnel, including the Wagner Group, accusing them of committing human rights abuses.[327]

By mid-November 2021, according to a report by the European External Action Service, most of the Central African Armed Forces deployed units were operating under direct command or supervision by Wagner Group PMCs, who took command of at least one EU-trained battalion (Bataillon d'Infanterie Territoriale 7), and the Wagner Group has established "a solid influence" on the CAR military's general staff and other government institutions.[328]


The independent media group the Project reported that Wagner PMCs arrived in Madagascar in April 2018, to guard political consultants that were hired by Yevgeny Prigozhin to accompany the presidential campaign of then-president Hery Rajaonarimampianina for the upcoming elections. Rajaonarimampianina lost the attempt at re-election, finishing third during the first round of voting,[91] although Prigozhin's consultants were said to had also worked with several of the other candidates in the months before the elections. Close to the end of the campaign, the strategists also helped the eventual winner of the elections, Andry Rajoelina, who was also supported by the United States and China.[329] One of the last acts of Rajaonarimampianina's administration was said to be to facilitate a Russian firm's takeover of Madagascar's national chromite producer "Kraoma"[330] and Wagner PMCs were reported to be guarding the chrome mines as of October 2018.[91]

Among the consultants to the different presidential candidates was also Konstantin Pikalov, who was initially assigned as campaign security chief to candidat Pastor Mailhol of Madagascar's Church of the Apocalypse. However, when it was clear Andry Rajoelina was the favorite to win the election, Pikalov was transferred to be Rajoelina's bodyguard.[35]


In October 2018, the British tabloid The Sun cited British intelligence officials that two Russian military bases had been set up in Benghazi and Tobruk, in eastern Libya, in support of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar who leads the Libyan National Army (LNA) in that country's civil war. It was said the bases were set up under the cover of the Wagner Group and that 'dozens' of GRU agents and special forces members were acting as trainers and liaisons in the area. Russian Kalibr missiles and S-300 SAM systems were also thought to be set up in Libya.[24][331]

The Head of the Russian contact group on intra-Libyan settlement, Lev Dengov, stated that The Sun report did not "correspond to reality", although RBK TV also confirmed the Russian military deployment to Libya.[25][26] By early March 2019, according to a British government source, around 300 Wagner PMCs were in Benghazi supporting Haftar.[332] At this time, the LNA was making large advances in the country's lawless south, capturing a number of towns in quick succession,[333] including the city of Sabha[334] and Libya's largest oil field.[335] By 3 March, most of the south, including the border areas, was under LNA control.[336][337][338]

Following the southern campaign, the LNA launched an offensive against the GNA-held capital of Tripoli, but the offensive stalled within two weeks on the outskirts of the city due to stiff resistance.[339] At the end of September, following reports of GNA airstrikes killing Russian mercenaries during the month south of Tripoli,[340][341][342] including one that reportedly left dozens dead[343] and Wagner commander Alexander Kuznetsov injured,[344][345] Western and Libyan officials stated that during the first week of September more than 100 Wagner PMCs arrived on the frontline to provide artillery support for Haftar's forces.[27] Following the GNA's recapture of a village south of Tripoli from the LNA, the GNA found the abandoned belongings of one of the PMCs.[346][347]

Subsequently, at the sites of various clashes along the frontline, GNA militiamen were recovering Russian material being left behind. By early November, the number of PMCs had grown to 200 or 300 and Wagner snipers were causing a number of casualties among GNA frontline fighters, with 30 percent of the deaths in one unit being due to the Russian snipers. On one day, nine GNA fighters were killed by sniper fire. In another incident at the frontline town of ‘Aziziya, three GNA fighters were killed by snipers while assaulting a Russian-occupied school. The PMCs eventually blew a hole in the wall of a classroom and escaped as the GNA attacked the school with Turkish armored vehicles. The PMCs' snipers killed a number of competent GNA mid-level commanders along the frontline. The presence of the PMCs also lead to more precise mortar fire being directed at the GNA. The PMCs were also equipped with laser-guided howitzer shells and thus artillery fire had become more precise through laser designation from ground spotters. They were also reportedly using hollow point ammunition in contravention of rules of war. With the ground fighting in the war among the local factions being considered amateurish, it was thought that the arrival of the PMCs could have an outsized impact.[348][349][350][351][352] Additionally, the PMCs introduced land mines and improvised explosive devices into the conflict, planting a number of booby traps and minefields on the outskirts of Tripoli, as well as at least in one residential neighborhood of the capital.[353] According to Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya expert at The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, the PMCs' toughness, lethal techniques and coordination discipline instilled fear in the GNAs' forces[354][351] as their morale suffered.[355]

A Wagner headquarters was set up at a hospital in the town of Esbia, 50 kilometers south of Tripoli, where the PMCs were stated to have detained and shot the family of a man who had stumbled upon the contractors by mistake. Three people were killed, while the man and another family member managed to survive the execution.[356]

At the end of October 2019, Facebook suspended accounts it said were part of a Russian disinformation campaign linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. The campaign targeted eight African countries. At least some of the Facebook accounts came from the Wagner Group[357] and the one operation that was attribute to Wagner was supporting two potential future political competitors in Libya. It had Egyptian page managers and the pages included Muammar Gaddafi nostalgia content. They also bolstered Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.[358] The next month, the GNA stated that two Russians who were arrested by their forces in early July were employed by the Wagner Group.[359] The two were arrested on suspicion of seeking to influence elections and were said to be involved in “securing a meeting” with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.[360] Later, it was reported that the two Russians had three meetings with Gaddafi by April 2019.[361]

In mid-November, the United States Congress was preparing bipartisan sanctions against the PMCs in Libya,[362] whose number had risen to 1,400, according to several Western officials.[363] The GNA, for its part, stated it documented between 600 and 800 PMCs in the country.[364] These included 25 pilots, trainers and support crew, with the pilots flying missions in refurbished LNA Su-22 fighter-bombers.[363]

On 20 November, an Italian military drone crashed near Tripoli,[365] with the LNA claiming it had shot it down.[366] The next day, a US military drone was also shot down over Tripoli,[367] although the LNA stated it had been brought down by mistake.[368] According to the US, the drone was shot down by Russian air defenses which were operated either by Russian PMCs or the LNA. A GNA official also stated that Russian PMCs appeared to be responsible.[369] An estimated 25 Wagner military technicians were thought to had established transmission towers and platforms atop buildings south of Tripoli, which lead to the bringing down of the drones by jamming of control signals for the aircraft.[351]

On 12 December, a new assault by the LNA was launched towards Tripoli,[370][371] with the LNA making several advances.[372][373] It was said the Russian PMCs were leading the LNA assault.[354][355] Over a two-day period, the PMCs, who were equipped with sophisticated drone-jamming technology and artillery, launched 2,500 mortar or artillery projectiles[355] and brought down a Turkish drone which was deployed by the GNA in an attempt to deter the LNA push. The drone was the sixth of seven deployed by Turkey in June that had been brought down by this point.[351] In early January 2020, The Libya Observer reported the Russian Air Force had transported fighters belonging to two other Russian private military companies, Moran and Shield, from Syria to Libya to further support the LNA.[374] Meanwhile, according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the number of Wagner PMCs in Libya had reached 2,500.[375] Later, he also accused the United Arab Emirates of funding the PMCs.[376]

Following Turkey's and Russia's call for a ceasefire in Libya on 8 January 2020,[377] the GNA claimed a significant number of Wagner fighters had withdrawn from the frontline via helicopters to the Al Jufra Airbase.[378] Towards the end of February, a Wagner PMC stated for the Russian information agency InterRight that all of the PMCs had been withdrawn from Libya due to the ceasefire.[379]

However, at the end of March, the GNA claimed to had targeted a building in the Qasr Bin Ghashir area south of Tripoli which had been occupied by Russian PMCs that had been responsible for several recent attacks on Tripoli neighborhoods.[380] On 2 April, GNA airstrikes in two areas south of Bani Walid targeted an ammunition convoy, as well as a fuel convoy, reportedly destroying six trucks. Wagner PMCs were claimed to be in the vehicles, with one of them being killed and another wounded.[381] On 22 April, the GNA's Interior Minister accused the Wagner Group of carrying out a chemical attack against its forces in the Salah al-Din area of southern Tripoli.[382] According to the Minister, Wagner snipers shot dead GNA fighters who had succumbed to nerve agents.[383]

In early May, according to a UN report, between 800 and 1,200 Wagner PMCs were deployed in Libya in support of the LNA.[384] They were operating in specialized military tasks, including sniper teams.[385] The UN also confirmed the presence of Syrian fighters[386] who were transported to Libya since the start of the year via at least 33 flights operated by the Cham Wings airline. The Syrians numbered less than 2,000[386] and were made up of former rebels recruited by the Wagner Group, under Russian military supervision, to fight alongside them.[387][388] Mid-May, GNA artillery reportedly shelled a Wagner base[389] that was used for observation, intelligence and organizing operations.[390]

In late May, the GNA captured the strategic Al-Watiya Air Base[391] and advanced into several districts of southern Tripoli,[392] during which they captured three military camps.[393] During the fighting, the GNA reported three Wagner PMCs were killed, with the body of one of them being seized.[394] The first Syrian fighter from the force recruited to support the Wagner Group also died.[395] Following these advances, Wagner's PMCs started to evacuate via Bani Walid's airport to Jufra,[396] with hundreds being evacuated on 25 May. According to the GNA, between 1,500 and 1,600 "mercenaries" withdrew from Tripoli's frontlines in the previous days.[397] The PMCs also pulled back their artillery and other heavy weapons during the withdrawal from southern Tripoli.[398] On 26 May, according to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), Russia deployed fighter jets to the Al Jufra Airbase[399] to support Wagner's PMCs. The jets arrived from an airbase in Russia via Syria, where they were repainted to conceal their Russian markings.[400][401] The LNA denied it received new fighter jets.[402]

Following the collapse of the LNA's offensive on Tripoli,[403] the GNA launched an assault on the LNA-held city of Sirte in early June,[404] managing initially to capture parts of the city,[405] before a LNA counter-attack pushed the GNA's forces back.[406] Subsequently, while the GNA was preparing a second assault,[407] Russian PMCs were planting landmines in and around Sirte to "obstruct the advance" of the GNA.[353][408][409] Mid-June, AFRICOM reported one of the newly arrived Russian aircraft was spotted taking of from the Al Jufra Airbase, while a MiG-29 fighter jet was seen operating near Sirte. There was concern the aircraft were being operated by the PMCs.[410] At the end of the month, the GNA claimed a Wagner rocket attack west of Sirte left one civilian dead.[411]

Towards the end of June, the Al Jufra airbase was reportedly turned into a Wagner Group command center for operations to take control of the country's southern oil fields[412] and the PMCs at the base were said to include Ukrainians and Serbians, besides the Russian contractors.[413] Subsequently, Wagner PMCs and pro-LNA Sudanese mercenaries, in coordination with a pro-LNA militia known as the Petroleum Facilities Guard, entered and secured Libya's largest oil field, the El Sharara oil field.[414][415][416] The PMCs also secured the oil port of Sidra on the Mediterranean coast.[417][418] Towards the end of July, "foreign mercenaries" were also reported to be at the Ras Lanuf petrochemical complex, Zuwetina oil port and Zallah field.[419]

In July, the United States imposed sanctions on Wagner individuals and entities for the planting of landmines in and around Tripoli.[87] Meanwhile, according to AFRICOM, Russia continued to supply the LNA through the Wagner Group with SA-22 missile launch vehicles, GAZ Tigr IMVs, Typhoon MRAPs and land mines. A total of 14 Mig-29 and Su-24 fighter jets had also been delivered.[420][421] According to a UN report, 338 Russian military flights from Syria to Libya were conducted between November 2019, and July 2020, in support of the Wagner Group.[422] In early August, a 21-vehicle Wagner convoy moved from Jufra to Sirte. Concurrently, the LNA, supported by the PMCs, were reinforcing the Jarif valley south of Sirte with ditches and barriers.[423]

Mid-September, it was confirmed the Wagner Group was conducting air-strikes in support of the LNA, with two Mig-29s piloted by the PMCs crashing,[424] one at the end of June, and the other in early September. A video of the second jets' pilot circulated online, showing him being rescued by an LNA combat helicopter after he parachuted and landed in the desert.[425][426] Towards the end of September, a helicopter transporting ammunition crashed in Sokna, near Al Jufra, while en route to an oil field. Four PMCs were killed in the crash.[427]

On 23 October 2020, a new cease-fire agreement was reached in Libya,[428] with peace talks to subsequently begin.[429] The talks started on 12 November. However, the same day, the GNA's army stated it would not accept further talks with the presence of the PMCs and their anti-aircraft systems in Sirte, after the LNA conducted live-fire exercises and the PMCs blocked their delegation from landing in Sirte, according to the GNA.[430]

In December 2020, the United States' Pentagon revealed that the United Arab Emirates was funding the Russian PMCs in Libya and was the main financial supporter of the Wagner Group.[431][432] By late January 2021, the PMCs built a large trench, or a series of trenches, extending about 70 kilometers from Sirte towards the Wagner stronghold of Jufra. The trench was bolstered by a series of elaborate fortifications designed to disrupt land attacks. More than 30 defensive positions were dug along the trench with key positions near the Jufra air base and at the Brak airfield further south, where radar defenses were installed and fortified.[433][434]


In late January 2019, Wagner PMCs arrived in Venezuela during the presidential crisis that was unfolding. They were sent to provide security for President Nicolás Maduro who was facing U.S.-backed opposition protests as part of the socioeconomic and political crisis that had been gripping the country since 2010. The leader of a local chapter of a paramilitary group of Cossacks with ties to the PMCs reported that about 400 contractors may be in Venezuela at that point. It was said that the PMCs flew in two chartered aircraft to Havana, Cuba, from where they transferred onto regular commercial flights to Venezuela. An anonymous Russian source close to the Wagner Group stated that another group of PMCs had already arrived in advance of the May 2018 presidential election.[29][435] Before the 2019 flare-up of protests, the PMCs were in Venezuela to mostly provide security for Russian business interests like the Russian energy company Rosneft. They also assisted in the training of the Venezuelan National Militia and the pro-Maduro Colectivos paramilitaries in 2018.[436]


In early August 2019, the Wagner Group received a contract with the government of Mozambique over two other private military companies, OAM and Black Hawk, by offering their services for lower costs.[437] At the end of that month,[438] the government of Mozambique approved a resolution ratifying the agreement from April 2018 on the entry of Russian military ships into national ports.[439] On 13 September, 160 PMCs from the Wagner Group arrived on a Russian An-124 cargo plane in the country[440] to provide technical and tactical assistance to the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) and were stationed in three military barracks in the northern provinces of Nampula, Macomia and Mueda.[439]

On 25 September, a second Russian cargo plane[440] landed in Nampula province and unloaded large-calibre weapons and ammunition belonging to the Wagner Group, which were then transported to the Cabo Delgado province where, since 5 October 2017, an Islamist insurgency had been taking place.[439] At least one of the two cargo planes belonged to the 224th Flight Unit of the Russian Air Force.[440] Overall, 200 PMCs, including elite troops, three attack helicopters and crew arrived in Mozambique to provide the training and combat support in Cabo Delgado, where the Islamist militants had burned villages, carried out beheadings and displaced hundreds of people.[441]

Starting on 5 October, the Mozambique military conducted several successful operations, in collaboration with the PMCs, against the insurgents[30] along the border with Tanzania.[440] During these operations, the military and the PMCs bombed insurgent bases in two areas, pushing them into the woods. At this time, the insurgents launched attacks on two bases, during which more than 35 insurgents and three PMCs were killed. Meanwhile, on 8 October, a Russian ship entered the port of Nacala carrying just over 17 containers of different types of weapons, especially explosives, which were transported to the battlefield.[30] Russia, on its part, denied it had any troops in Mozambique.[442]

Following the arrival of the PMCs, ISIL reinforced jihadist forces in Mozambique, leading to an increase in the number of militant attacks.[443] On 10 and 27 October, two ambushes took place during which seven PMCs were killed. During the ambush at the end of October, in addition to five PMCs, 20 Mozambique soldiers also died when Islamic militants set up a barricade on the road as a FADM military convoy arrived. Four of the five PMCs were shot dead and then beheaded.[444] Three vehicles were burned in the attack.[445] Some of the deaths during the fighting in Mozambique were reportedly the result of a "friendly fire" incident.[446]

By mid-November, two Mozambique military sources described growing tensions between Wagner and the FADM after a number of failed military operations, with one saying joint patrols had almost stopped. Analysts, mercenaries and security experts, including the heads of OAM and Black Hawk, which operate in Sub-Saharan Africa, were of the opinion that Wagner was struggling in Mozambique since they were operating in a theater where they did not have much expertise. According to John Gartner, the head of OAM and a former Rhodesian soldier, the Wagner Group was "out of their depth" in Mozambique. At the same time, Dolf Dorfling, the founder of Black Hawk and a former South African colonel, said sources told them that the Wagner Group had started to search for local military expertise.[437]

Towards the end of that month, it was reported that 200 PMCs had withdrawn from Mozambique, following the deaths among its fighters.[446] Still, as of the end of November, Russian fighters and equipment were still present in the port city of Pemba and they were also based in the coastal town of Mocímboa da Praia.[440] The PMCs had also withdrawn to Nacala to re-organize.[443]

By early 2020, the number of attacks in Cabo Delgado surged, with 28 taking place throughout January and early February. The violence spread to nine of the province's 16 districts. The attacks included beheadings, mass kidnappings and villages burned to the ground. Most of the attacks were conducted by militants, but some were also made by bandits.[447] On 23 March, the militants captured the key town of Mocimboa de Praia in Cabo Delgado.[448] Two weeks later, the insurgents launched attacks against half a dozen villages in the province.[449]

On 8 April, the military launched helicopter strikes against militant bases in two districts. Journalist Joseph Hanlon published a photograph showing one of the helicopter gunships that took part in the attack and said it was manned by Wagner PMCs. However, two other sources cited by the Daily Maverick stated the contractors belonged to the South African private military company Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) and that the Wagner Group had pulled out of Mozambique in March.[450]


Mid-September 2021, according to diplomatic and security sources, an agreement was close to being finalized that would allow the Wagner Group to operate in Mali. According to conflicting sources, at least 1,000 PMCs or less would be deployed to Mali, which has been witnessing a civil war since 2012, and the Wagner Group would be paid about 6 billion CFA francs a month for training of the Malian military and providing protection for government officials. France, which previously ruled Mali as a colony, was making a diplomatic push to prevent the agreement being enacted. Since late May 2021, Mali has been ruled by a military junta that came into power following a coup d'état.[451] In response, Mali’s Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga in his address to the UN General Assembly stated "The new situation resulting from the end of Operation Barkhane puts Mali before a fait accompli – abandoning us, mid-flight to a certain extent – and it leads us to explore pathways and means to better ensure our security autonomously, or with other partners".[452]

The United Kingdom, European Union and Ivory Coast also warned Mali not to engage into an agreement with the Wagner Group.[453][454][455] Still, on 30 September, Mali received a shipment of four Mil Mi-17 helicopters, as well as arms and ammunition, as part of a contract agreed in December 2020. The shipment was received by Mali's Defence Minister, who praised Russia as "a friendly country with which Mali has always maintained a very fruitful partnership".[456][457]

Casualties and awards[edit]

Conflict Period Wagner casualties Notes
War in Donbas June 2014–October 2015 30–80 killed[120] The Ukrainian SBU claimed 36 PMCs were killed[458] during the fighting at Luhansk International Airport (15) and the Battle of Debaltseve (21).[6]
Four of those who died in the battle for the airport were killed at the nearby village of Khryashchevatoe.[459]
Syrian Civil War September 2015–December 2017 151–201 killed[460][461][15]
900+ wounded[460]
CIT reported a conservative estimate of at least 101 being killed between October 2015 and mid-December 2017.[69]
The founder of CIT stated the death toll was at least 100–200,[461] while another CIT blogger said at least 150 were killed and more than 900 were wounded.[460]
Fontanka reported a conservative estimate of at least 73 dead by mid-December 2017,[69] 40–60 of which died during the first several months of 2017.[143]
A former PMC officer stated no fewer than 100 died by the end of August 2016.[52]
One more PMC was killed in late December 2017.[15]
Syrian civil warBattle of Khasham 7 February 2018 14–64 killed (confirmed)[210][207]
80–100 killed (estimated)[205][206]
100–200 wounded[205][206]
The Ukrainian SBU claimed 80 were killed and 100 wounded,[206] naming 64 of the dead.[207]
A source with ties to Wagner and a Russian military doctor claimed 80–100 were killed and 200 wounded.[205]
A Russian journalist believed between 20 and 25 died,[202] while similarly CIT estimated a total of between 20 and 30 had died.[208]
The Novaya Gazeta newspaper reported 13 dead, while the Baltic separate Cossack District ataman stated no more than 15–20 died.[209]
Wagner commanders put the death toll at 14 or 15 at the most.[210][211][41]
Syrian civil war May 2018–present 17 killed[462] In addition, three PMCs belonging to the Russian private military company Shield also died mid-June 2019. Two of the three were former Wagner members.[463]
Central African Republic Civil War March 2018–present 12 killed[304][464][465][466]
Sudanese Revolution December 2018–January 2019 2 killed[266]
Insurgency in Cabo Delgado September 2019–March 2020 10 killed[467]
Second Libyan Civil War September 2019–present 21–48[468] Russian blogger Mikhail Polynkov claimed no less than 100 PMCs had been killed by early April 2020. However, this was not independently confirmed.[469]

Families of killed PMCs are prohibited from talking to the media under a non-disclosure that is a prerequisite for them to get compensation from the company. The standard compensation for the family of a killed Wagner employee is up to 5 million rubles (about 80,000 dollars), according to a Wagner official.[52] In contrast, the girlfriend of a killed fighter stated the families are paid between 22,500 and 52,000 dollars depending on the killed PMC's rank and mission.[470] In mid-2018, Russian military veterans urged the Russian government to acknowledge sending private military contractors to fight in Syria, in an attempt to secure financial and medical benefits for the PMCs and their families.[471]

The Sogaz International Medical Centre in Saint Petersburg, a clinic owned by the large insurance company AO Sogaz, has treated PMCs who had been injured in combat overseas since 2016. The company's senior officials and owners are either relatives of Russian President Putin or others linked to him. The clinic's general director, Vladislav Baranov, also has a business relationship with Maria Vorontsova, Putin's eldest daughter.[345]

Wagner PMCs have received state awards[8] in the form of military decorations[48] and certificates signed by Russian President Putin.[472] Wagner commanders Andrey Bogatov and Andrey Troshev were awarded the Hero of the Russian Federation honor for assisting in the first capture of Palmyra in March 2016. Bogatov was seriously injured during the battle. Meanwhile, Alexander Kuznetsov and Dmitry Utkin had reportedly won the Order of Courage four times.[44] Family members of killed PMCs also received medals from Wagner itself, with the mother of one killed fighter being given two medals, one for "heroism and valour" and the other for "blood and bravery".[473] A medal for conducting operations in Syria was also issued by Wagner to its PMCs.[474]

In mid-December 2017, a powerlifting tournament was held in Ulan-Ude, capital city of the Russian Republic of Buryatia, which was dedicated to the memory of Vyacheslav Leonov, a Wagner PMC who was killed during the campaign in Syria's Deir ez-Zor province.[475][476] The same month, Russia's president signed a decree establishing International Volunteer Day in Russia, as per the UN resolution from 1985, which will be celebrated annually every 5 December. The Russian Poliksal news site associated the Russian celebration of Volunteer Day with honoring Wagner PMCs.[477]

In late January 2018, an image emerged of a monument in Syria, dedicated to "Russian volunteers".[478] The inscription on the monument in Arabic read: "To Russian volunteers, who died heroically in the liberation of Syrian oil fields from ISIL".[479][480] The monument was located at the Haiyan plant, about 50 kilometers from Palmyra,[481] where Wagner PMCs were deployed.[482] An identical monument was also erected in Luhansk in February 2018.[483] In late August 2018, a chapel was built near Goryachy Klyuch, Krasnodar Krai, in Russia in memory of Wagner PMCs killed in fighting against ISIL in Syria. For each of those killed a candle is lit in the chapel.[484] Towards the end of November 2018, it was revealed that a third monument, also identical to the two in Syria and Luhansk, was erected in front of the chapel, which is a few dozen kilometers from the PMC's training facility at Molkin.[485]

The leadership of the Wagner Group and its military instructors were reportedly invited to attend the military parade on 9 May 2018, dedicated to Victory Day.[58]

On 14 May 2021, a Russian movie inspired by the Russian military instructors in the Central African Republic premiered in the CAR capital Bangui. Titled The Tourist, it depicts a group of Russian military advisors sent to the CAR on the eve of presidential elections and, following a violent rebellion, they defend locals against the rebels. The movie was reportedly financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin to improve the Wagner Group's reputation and included some Wagner PMCs as extras.[486]

Deaths of journalists[edit]

Death of Maksim Borodin[edit]

On 12 April 2018, investigative Russian journalist Maksim Borodin was found badly injured at the foot of his building, after falling from his fifth-floor balcony in Yekaterinburg.[487] He was subsequently hospitalized in a coma and died of his injuries three days later on 15 April.[70] In the weeks before his death, Borodin gained national attention[488] when he wrote about the deaths of Wagner PMCs in the battle with US-backed forces in eastern Syria in early February, that also involved U.S. air-strikes.[487] Throughout February and March, Borodin interviewed relatives and commanders of Wagner Group PMCs, and attended their funerals in the town of Asbest.[70]

Local officials said no suicide note was found but that his death was unlikely to be of a criminal nature. They also stated that at the time of his fall his apartment door had been locked from the inside, indicating that nobody had either entered or left.[487] Although the police continued their investigation, they were not treating his death as suspicious.[70] However, Polina Rumyantseva, chief editor of Novy Den, where Borodin worked, said before he died that she could not rule out a crime and that there was no reason for him to commit suicide. Harlem Désir of the OSCE said the death was "of serious concern" and called for a thorough investigation. Borodin's friend stated that one day before his fall, Borodin had contacted him at five o'clock in the morning saying there was "someone with a weapon on his balcony and people in camouflage and masks on the staircase landing". He had been attempting to find a lawyer, but later Borodin called his friend once again and said he made a mistake and that he thought the men had been taking part in some kind of training exercise.[487][70] After Borodin's death, Rumyantseva stated that Novy Den had been in his apartment and that there were no signs of a struggle, while the investigators thought that Borodin had gone on the balcony to smoke and had fallen. Still, Rumyantseva stated "If there's even a hint of something criminal, we will make it public". Borodin also had a local repute for conducting investigation of prisons and corrupt officials in his native Sverdlovsk Oblast.[488]

CAR deaths[edit]

On 30 July 2018, three Russian journalists (Kirill Radchenko, Alexander Rastorguyev [ru] and Orkhan Dzhemal [ru]) belonging to the Russian online news organisation Investigation Control Centre (TsUR), which is linked to Mikhail Khodorkovsky, were ambushed and killed by unknown assailants in the Central African Republic, three days after they had arrived in the country to investigate local Wagner activities. The ambush took place 23 kilometers from Sibut when armed men emerged from the bush and opened fire on their vehicle. The journalists' driver survived the attack,[489] but was afterward kept incommunicado by the authorities. In its response to the killings, Russia's foreign ministry noted that the dead journalists had been traveling without official accreditation.[32]

BBC News and AFP said the circumstances of their deaths were unclear.[490][491] According to the Interfax news agency, robbery could have been a motive. An expensive camera kit and more than 8,000 dollars disappeared from the scene,[490] although three canisters of gasoline, which is considered a valuable commodity in the CAR, were left in the vehicle.[492] A local official and their driver stated that the attackers were wearing turbans and speaking Arabic.[490][493] Russian and CAR state media initially reported that the authorities suspected Seleka rebels to be behind the killings.[284] According to local residents, interviewed by Khodorkovsky's investigators, around 10 people had camped out nearby before the ambush, waiting there for several hours. Shortly before the attack, they saw another car with "three armed white men … and two Central Africans" pass by.[492] Per an initial report in The New York Times, there was no indication that the killings were connected with the journalists' investigation of the Wagner Group's activities in the Central African Republic,[494] but a follow-up article cited a Human Rights Watch researcher who commented that "Many things don't add up" in regards to the mysterious killings. It reaffirmed there was nothing to contradict the official version that the killings were a random act by thieves, but noted speculation within Russia that blamed the Wagner Group, while also adding a theory by a little known African news media outlet that France, which previously ruled the CAR when it was a colony, was behind the killings as a warning to Moscow to stay clear of its area of influence.[32] Moscow-based defence analyst Pavel Felgenhauer thought it was unlikely they were killed by Wagner's PMCs,[495] while the Ukrainian security service claimed that it had evidence about the PMCs involvement.[496]

During their investigation, the journalists tried to enter the PMCs' camp, but they were told that they needed accreditation from the country's Defense Ministry.[494] The accreditation was previously only given to an AFP journalist who was still not allowed to take any photographs or interview anyone. The killings took place one day after the journalists visited the Wagner Group encampment at Berengo.[493] According to Bellingcat's Christo Grozev, after the journalists arrived in the CAR, the Wagner Group's Col. Konstantin Pikalov issued a letter describing how they should be followed and spied on.[288]

In January 2019, it was revealed that, according to evidence gathered by Khodorkovsky's Dossier Center, a major in the Central African Gendarmerie was involved in the ambush. The major was in regular communication with the journalists' driver on the day of their murders and he had frequent communications with a Wagner PMC who was a specialist trainer in counter surveillance and recruitment in Central Africa. The police officer was also said to had attended a camp run by Russian military trainers on the border with Sudan, and maintained regular contact with Russian PMCs after his training.[497] The investigation into the murders by the Dossier Center was suspended two months later due to the lack of participation by government agencies and organizations.[498]

Other possible activities[edit]


On 23 August 2019, former Chechen commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, who was a veteran of the Second Chechen War and sought refuge in Germany in 2016, was shot and killed in Berlin. A Russian man was arrested after being spotted throwing a bicycle and a gun into the Spree river[499] and investigators were looking into whether the killing was a political assassination.[500] German Parliament member Patrick Sensburg theorized that the killer could be associated with Wagner's PMCs.[501]


In July 2020, ahead of the country's presidential election, Belarusian law enforcement agencies arrested 33 Wagner contractors. The arrests took place after the security agencies received information about over 200 PMCs arriving in the country "to destabilize the situation during the election campaign", according to the state-owned Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BelTA).[502] The Belarusian Security Council accused those arrested of preparing “a terrorist attack”.[503] The U.S.-funded Radio Liberty reported the contractors were possibly on their way to Sudan, citing video footage that showed Sudanese currency and a telephone card depicting Kassala's Khatmiya Mosque among the belongings of those who had been arrested.[502] Others also believed the contractors were simply using Belarus as a staging post on their way to or from their latest assignment,[503] possibly in Africa, with BBC News pointing out the footage of the Sudanese currency and a Sudanese phone card as well.[504] Russia confirmed the men were employed by a private security firm, but stated they had stayed in Belarus after missing their connecting flight to Turkey[505] and called for their swift release.[506] The head of the Belarusian investigative group asserted the contractors had no plans to fly further to Turkey and that they were giving "contradictory accounts". The PMCs stated they were on their way to Venezuela, Turkey, Cuba and Syria. Belarusian authorities also said they believed the husband of opposition presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya may have ties to the detained men and launched a criminal case against him.[505] The detained contractors were returned to Russia two weeks later.[507]

During the contractors' detention, Russian media reported that the Security Service of Ukraine had lured the PMCs to Belarus under the pretext of a contract for the protection of Rosneft facilities in Venezuela. The operation's plan was to force an emergency landing of the contractor's plane from Minsk as it flew through Ukrainian airspace and, once grounded, the PMCs would have been arrested.[508] Later, Russian president Putin also stated that the detained men were victims of a joint Ukrainian-United States intelligence operation.[509][510] Although the Ukrainian president's chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, denied involvement in the detentions,[511] subsequently, a number of Ukrainian journalists, members of parliament, and politicians confirmed the operation. The operation was supposedly planned for a year as Ukraine identified PMCs who fought in eastern Ukraine and were involved in the July 2014 shoot down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. The operation failed after being postponed by the Office of the President of Ukraine, which was reportedly informed of it only in its final stage. Ukrainian reporter Yuri Butusov accused Andriy Yermak of “betrayal” after he reportedly deliberately released information on the operation to Russia.[508] Butusov further reported that the Turkish intelligence agency MİT was also involved in the operation.[512] The failure of the operation led to firings and criminal proceedings among Ukraine's Security Service personnel, according to a Ukrainian intelligence representative using the pseudonym "Bogdan".[513] Former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko also claimed in December 2020 that he sanctioned the operation at the end of 2018.[514]


Several days after Russian media reported that Russian PMCs were ready to fight against Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh,[515] a source within the Wagner Group, as well as Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, reported Wagner contractors were sent to support armed forces of the partially recognized Republic of Artsakh against Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war as ATGM operators.[516][517] However, Bellingcat reported that the Wagner Group was not present in Nagorno-Karabakh, pointing to the Reverse Side of the Medal (RSOTM) public channel, used by Russian PMCs, including Wagner. RSOTM posted two images and a song alluding to the possibility of Wagner PMCs arriving in Nagorno-Karabakh, but Bellingcat determined the images were unrelated.[518] Following the end of the war, retired military captain Viktor Zlobov stated Wagner PMCs took a significant role in managing to preserve the territory that remained under Armenian control during the conflict and were the ones mostly responsible for the Armenians managing to keep control of the town of Shusha for as long as they did before it was ultimately captured by Azerbaijan during the major battle that took place. Turkey reported 380 "blondes with blue eyes" took part in the conflict on the side of Artsakh, while some Russian publications put the number of Wagner PMCs who arrived in the region in early November at 500. 300 of these were said to had taken part in the Battle of Shusha[519] and a photo of a Wagner PMC, apparently taken in front a church in Shusha during the war, appeared on the internet the following month.[520] The Russian news outlet OSN reported the arrival of the PMCs was also one of the factors that led to Azerbaijan's halt of their offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh.[521]

See also[edit]

Further reading[edit]

  • Kimberly Marten (2019) "Russia's use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group." Post-Soviet Affairs, 35:3, 181–204.
  • Parker, John W. (2017). Putin's Syrian Gambit: Sharper Elbows, Bigger Footprint, Stickier Wicket. National Defense University Press. ISBN 9780160939983.
  • Nick Sturdee (2021) "The Wagner Group files.", NewLines Manazine


  1. ^ a b c d Gostev, Aleksandr; Coalson, Robert (16 December 2016). "Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge From The Shadows". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  2. ^ a b c d e Quinn, Allison (30 March 2016). "Vladimir Putin sent Russian mercenaries to 'fight in Syria and Ukraine'". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 4 August 2017.
  3. ^ a b "Putin Wants to Win, But Not at All Costs". Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg. 6 December 2017. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  4. ^ a b c d "Revealed: Russia's 'Secret Syria Mercenaries'". Sky News. 10 August 2016. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  5. ^ a b c d "Russian Mercenaries in Syria". Warsaw Institute Foundation. 22 April 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  6. ^ a b c "SBU exposes involvement of Russian 'Wagner PMC' headed by Utkin in destroying Il-76 in Donbas, Debaltseve events – Hrytsak". Interfax-Ukraine. 7 October 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  7. ^ Sautreuil, Pierre (9 March 2016). "Believe It or Not, Russia Dislikes Relying on Military Contractors". War Is Boring. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g Korotkov, Denis (29 March 2016). Они сражались за Пальмиру (in Russian). Fontanka.ru. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  9. ^ a b Karouny, Mariam (20 October 2015). "Three Russians killed in Syria: pro-government source". Reuters. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  10. ^ Maria Tsvetkova; Anton Zverev (3 November 2016). "Russian Soldiers Are Secretly Dying In Syria". Huffington Post. Retrieved 19 February 2018.
  11. ^ a b c Leviev, Ruslan (22 March 2017). "They fought for Palmyra… again: Russian mercenaries killed in battle with ISIS". Conflict Intelligence Team. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  12. ^ a b Tomson, Chris (21 September 2017). "VIDEO: Russian Army intervenes in northern Hama, drives back Al-Qaeda militants". al-Masdar News. Retrieved 24 September 2017.
  13. ^ a b c "The media reported the death of another soldier PMC Wagner in Syria". en.news-4-u.ru. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  14. ^ a b Dmitriy. "В боях в Сирии погиб уроженец Оренбурга Сергей Карпунин". geo-politica.info. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  15. ^ a b c d "Еще один доброволец из Томской области погиб в Сирии". vtomske.ru. 15 January 2018. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  16. ^ a b "Russians dead in 'battle' in Syria's east". www.yahoo.com.
  17. ^ a b Aboufadel, Leith (13 February 2018). "US attack on pro-gov't forces in Deir Ezzor killed more than 10 Russians (photos)".
  18. ^ a b "ЧВК "Вагнер" не дала боевикам уничтожить мирное население Восточной Гуты - ИА REX".
  19. ^ a b Desk, News (1 May 2019). "In pictures: Russian snipers deployed near Idlib front as offensive approaches". Al-Masdar News.
  20. ^ a b c "Появилось видео из Судана, где российские наемники тренируют местных военных". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  21. ^ a b "Beyond Syria and Ukraine: Wagner PMC Expands Its Operations to Africa". Jamestown.
  22. ^ Gostev, Alexander (25 April 2018). Кремлевская "Драка за Африку". Наемники Пригожина теперь и в джунглях (in Russian). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Retrieved 26 April 2018.
  23. ^ a b Central African Republic troops beat back rebels with Russian help
  24. ^ a b "Putin Plants Troops, Weapons in Libya to Boost Strategic Hold". Al Bawaba.
  25. ^ a b "Новый плацдарм: что известно о переброске российских военных в Ливию". РБК.
  26. ^ a b Suchkov, Maxim (12 October 2018). "Analysis: Reports on Russian troops in Libya spark controversy". Al-Monitor.
  27. ^ a b c "Putin-Linked Mercenaries Are Fighting on Libya's Front Lines".
  28. ^ a b Wagner PMC is secret detachment of Russia's General Staff of Armed Forces – confirmed by mercenaries’ ID papers, says SBU Head Vasyl Hrytsak. Now we’ll only have to wait for information from Russian officials as to which particular “Cathedral” in Sudan or
  29. ^ a b "Exclusive: Kremlin-linked contractors help guard Venezuela's Maduro - sources". Reuters. 25 January 2019.
  30. ^ a b c d ""War 'declared'": Report on latest military operations in Mocimboa da Praia and Macomia - Carta". Mozambique.
  31. ^ "Russia's Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge from the Shadows".
  32. ^ a b c Higgins, Andrew; Nechepurenko, Ivan (7 August 2018). "In Africa, Mystery Murders Put Spotlight on Kremlin's Reach". The New York Times. New York. Archived from the original on 31 January 2020. Retrieved 8 August 2018.
  33. ^ "Уткин Дмитрий Валерьевич". spisok-putina.
  34. ^ "СБУ назвала всех "вагнеровцев" на фото с Путиным в Кремле". Ukrinform (in Russian). 7 October 2017.
  35. ^ a b c d e f Putin Chef's Kisses of Death: Russia's Shadow Army's State-Run Structure Exposed
  36. ^ a b c Vaux, Pierre (29 March 2016). "Fontanka Investigates Russian Mercenaries Dying For Putin In Syria And Ukraine". The Interpreter. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  37. ^ a b Из Молькино в Пальмиру: как тренируют российских наемников 31 March 2016. (in Russian)
  38. ^ "Last battle of the Slavic Corps". Fontanka. 14 November 2013. Retrieved 25 January 2018.
  39. ^ "The Case of the Keystone Cossacks". Foreign Policy. 21 November 2013.
  40. ^ Parfitt, Tom (31 March 2016). "Russian-led private army sent to Syria". The Times. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  41. ^ a b c d "Проект 'Мясорубка'. Рассказывают три командира 'ЧВК Вагнера'" Radio Liberty, 7 March 2018. (in Russian)
  42. ^ a b c d "Wagner, Russian Blackwater in Syria". Yeni Şafak. 6 August 2017. Retrieved 14 August 2020.
  43. ^ a b c Roth, Andrew (5 October 2017). "The Russian captives who may link Syria, Ukraine and the Kremlin's fight against the opposition". The Washington Post. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  44. ^ a b "Vladimir Putin posed for a banquet photo with a mercenary previously convicted of kidnapping and robbery". Fontanka.ru. 21 August 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017 – via Meduza.
  45. ^ Песков подтвердил присутствие командира ЧВК Вагнера на приеме в Кремле TASS, 15 December 2016. (in Russian)
  46. ^ "Песков подтвердил присутствие Дмитрия Уткина на приеме в Кремле" [Peskov confirmed the presence of Dmitry Utkin at a reception in the Kremlin]. РБК (in Russian). Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  47. ^ a b "Russia flies 2,000 mercenary troops into Syria". Debkafile. 2 August 2017. Retrieved 4 August 2017.
  48. ^ a b Galeotti, Mark (29 August 2017). "Moscow's mercenaries reveal the privatisation of Russian geopolitics". openDemocracy. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  49. ^ Trevithick, Joseph. "Russian Mercenaries Take The Lead In Attacks On US And Allied Forces In Syria". The Drive.
  50. ^ "Exclusive: Russian civilians helping Assad use military base back home - witnesses". Reuters. 25 April 2018.
  51. ^ a b "28 сентября пришло 12 гробов" Radio Liberty, 6 October 2017.
  52. ^ a b c d "Russia's Wagner group fighters sighted in Syria". RBC (9). 31 August 2016. Retrieved 18 September 2017 – via Russia Beyond.
  53. ^ Korotkov, Denis (21 August 2017). Список Вагнера (in Russian). Fontanka.ru. Retrieved 22 August 2017.
  54. ^ "Exclusive: Kids' camp on a defense base? How Russian firms masked secret military work". Reuters. 4 April 2019.
  55. ^ "Российские 'штурмы' сирийской победы" Sovershenno Sekretno, 19 December 2017 (print edition No. 12 (December) 2017, p. 6).
  56. ^ a b "More Russian Fighters from Private 'Wagner Group' Die in Syria". The Moscow Times. 22 March 2017. Retrieved 4 August 2017.
  57. ^ Korotkov, Denis (22 October 2015). За Башара Асада - без флага, без Родины (in Russian). Fontanka.ru. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  58. ^ a b Ukraine's SBU identifies chief instructor of Ukrainian unit at Russia's PMC Wagner
    Russian military officers train the mercenaries of Wagner PVC, says SSU
  59. ^ a b Dragović, R.; Đurić, Lj. (17 April 2016). "Srbin oslobađao drevnu Palmiru?". Večernje novosti (in Serbian). Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  60. ^ a b Ristić, Marija (22 April 2016). "Put srpskih plaćenika iz Ukrajine u Siriju". Balkan Insight (in Serbian). Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  61. ^ Stanić, Miloš; Tašković, Marko (23 June 2017). "U SMRT ZA 5.000 DOLARA Srbin poginuo ratujući na ruskoj strani protiv džihadista u Siriji". Blic (in Serbian). Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  62. ^ "Facebook Reveals Serbian Fighters' Role in Ukraine War". Balkan Insight. 27 December 2017. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  63. ^ "Ukraine lists Serbs fighting for Russian unit – media". www.unian.info.
  64. ^ "Donbass Brothers: How Serbian Fighters Were Deployed in Ukraine". 13 December 2018.
  65. ^ a b SBU says Russia's Wagner mercenaries involved in Donbas war Kyiv Post, 7 October 2017.
  66. ^ Korotkov, Denis (21 August 2017). Кого Россия потеряла в Сирии (in Russian). Fontanka.ru. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  67. ^ a b "Ukrainians fight and die among Russian Wagner mercenaries | KyivPost - Ukraine's Global Voice". KyivPost. 27 February 2018.
  68. ^ "Ukraine Names Moldovan Fighting for Russian Paramilitary Unit". 2 August 2018.
  69. ^ a b c d "Thousands of Russian private contractors fighting in Syria". AP News. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  70. ^ a b c d e Luxmoore, Matthew (16 April 2018). "Russian Journalist Who Reported on Secretive Paramilitary Dies". The New York Times.
  71. ^ "Navalny asks FSB to investigate Putin's cook". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  72. ^ "The man allegedly behind Russia's 'troll factory' is reportedly trying to buy the news outlet that keeps exposing his business empire — Meduza". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  73. ^ "Кухня частной армии". 9 June 2016. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  74. ^ "Suspected Russian mercenary ex-colonel lands in Petersburg drunk tank with 95,000 dollars in his pockets — Meduza". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  75. ^ "Media: Wagner Group commander becomes CEO of Putin's friend's catering business". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  76. ^ "Yevgeny Prigozhin: who is the man leading Russia's push into Africa?". the Guardian. 11 June 2019.
  77. ^ "Diplomacy and Dividends: Who Really Controls the Wagner Group? - Foreign Policy Research Institute". www.fpri.org.
  78. ^ Putin-Linked Mercenaries Are Fighting on Libya's Front Lines
  79. ^ "U.S. Adds More Russians To Sanctions List, Including 'Putin's Chef'". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  80. ^ "Treasury Designates Individuals and Entities Involved in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine". US Department of the Treasury. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  81. ^ Buravich, Ekaterina. "Yevgeny Prigozhin has denied communication with the PMC Wagner - NewsWorld". NewsWorld. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  82. ^ a b Kramer, Andrew E. (5 July 2017). "Russia Deploys a Potent Weapon in Syria: The Profit Motive". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 4 August 2017.
  83. ^ "Treasury Designates Individuals and Entities Involved in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine" U.S. Department of the Treasury, 20 June 2017.
  84. ^ CAATSA Section 231: "Addition of 33 Entities and Individuals to the List of Specified Persons and Imposition of Sanctions on the Equipment Development Department"
  85. ^ U.S. Adds Russians Indicted by Mueller to a Sanctions List
  86. ^ Borger, Julian (20 September 2018). "US hits China with sanctions for buying Russian fighter jets and missiles". The Guardian.
  87. ^ a b c US imposes sanctions on Russia's Wagner Group over role in Libya, Sudan
  88. ^ EU and UK sanction Russian oligarch Evgeny Prigozhin over support for mercenaries in Libya
  89. ^ "Навальный опубликовал кодекс чести бойцов 'ЧВК Вагнера'" [Navalny published the code of honor of the fighters of 'PMC Wagner']. EG.RU (in Russian).
  90. ^ "Russian News Accidentally Reveals Evidence of PMC Wagner in CAR". POLYGRAPH.info.
  91. ^ a b c "Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru". Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru.
  92. ^ "Letter: How hard is it for entities such as the Wagner Group to sow destabilisation in SA?". BusinessLIVE.
  93. ^ Cole, Matthew; Emmons, Alex (13 April 2020). "Erik Prince Offered Lethal Services to Sanctioned Russian Mercenary Firm Wagner".
  94. ^ Russia's Wagner Group reportedly deployed in Africa
  95. ^ New details released about the change of head of the Russian 'Wagner' group
  96. ^ Don't Be Fooled: Russia Attacked U.S. Troops in Syria: Mattis gave Putin "plausible deniability" for a military assault that went badly awry. Bloomberg, 16 February 2018.
  97. ^ "Реинкарнация Робин Гуда: как родилась легенда о ЧВК 'Вагнер'" rueconomics.ru (ФБА "Экономика сегодня"), 24 March 2017. (in Russian)
  98. ^ "Российские ЧВК – миф российской пропаганды" InformNapalm.org, 5 November 2016. (in Russian)
  99. ^ ЦУР: Группа Вагнера ведет активный набор новых бойцов Open Russia, 25 January 2017.
  100. ^ "США пытаются наказать мифическую российскую ЧВК" Vzglyad 21 July 2017. (in Russian)
  101. ^ "Сирийские потери 'Славянского корпуса'" Radio Liberty, 13 December 2016. (in Russian)
  102. ^ Mark Galeotti. Moscow's mercenaries reveal the privatisation of Russian geopolitics 29 August 2017.
  103. ^ "ЧВК Вагнера учредило государство" Radio Liberty, 4 October 2017. (in Russian)
  104. ^ a b Niklas Eklund, Jörgen Elfving. Russian Private Military Companies—Redwater? The Jamestown Foundation: Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 39.
  105. ^ a b "How 'Wagner' came to Syria" The Economist, 2 November 2017.
  106. ^ a b c Owen Matthews. PUTIN’S SECRET ARMIES WAGED WAR IN SYRIA—WHERE WILL THEY FIGHT NEXT?, Newsweek, 17 January 2018.
  107. ^ Tsvetkova, Maria; Zverev, Anton (3 November 2016). "Ghost soldiers: the Russians secretly dying for the Kremlin in Syria". Reuters. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  108. ^ "Из Пальмиры в цинковых гробах" Radio Liberty, 22 March 2017. (in Russian)
  109. ^ В СБУ раскрыли любопытные подробности о наемниках РФ на Донбассе Segodnya, 4 September 2017. (in Russian).
  110. ^ SBU head Hrytsak on "Wagner's group: It's like a private Putin's army operating tanks, armored vehicles, Grads, and heavy artillery" censor.net, 4 September 2017.
  111. ^ Peters, Ralph (14 February 2018). "Putin had to approve Russian attack on US troops". New York Post.
  112. ^ Security Service of Ukraine (28 January 2019). "Василь Грицак: документи найманців "ПВК Вагнера" підтверджують – це таємний загін ГУ ГШ ЗС РФ. Залишається почути від офіційних осіб РФ, який саме "шпиль" у Судані або ЦАР вони відвідували" (in Ukrainian).
  113. ^ The Bellingcat Investigation Team (30 January 2019). "Wagner Mercenaries With GRU-issued Passports: Validating SBU's Allegation". Bellingcat.
  114. ^ "No denial from Putin on Wagner mercenaries in Donbas". unian.info.
  115. ^ a b c d e f g Butusov, Yurii (31 March 2016). "Mystery of Wagner's identity unfolded: he is Russian officer and head of large private military company in Russia, who eliminated Mozgovoy, Dremov, and other terrorist leaders, and now is fighting in Syria". Censor.NET. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  116. ^ "Private military companies in Russia carrying out criminal orders of Kremlin, - InformNapalm. PHOTOS+VIDEO". InformNapalm. 31 August 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2017 – via Censor.NET.
  117. ^ Oliphant, Roland (2 March 2014). "Ukraine crisis: 'Polite people' leading the silent invasion of the Crimea". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  118. ^ Shevchenko, Vitaly (11 March 2014). ""Little green men" or "Russian invaders"?". BBC News. Retrieved 8 October 2017.
  119. ^ "Kremlin's mercenary armies kill in both Syrian, Ukrainian wars | KyivPost - Ukraine's Global Voice". Kyiv Post. 1 June 2018.
  120. ^ a b c d Korotkov, Denis (16 October 2015). "Славянский корпус" возвращается в Сирию (in Russian). Fontanka.ru. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  121. ^ Amos, Howard; McElroy, Damien (1 September 2014). "Ukraine withdraws from Luhansk airport after 'Russian tank column' attack". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  122. ^ Rujevic, Nemanja (14 August 2014). "Serbian mercenaries fighting in eastern Ukraine". Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  123. ^ a b "#MinskMonitor: Wagner's Role in Key Ukrainian Battle Revealed". Medium. 16 July 2018.
  124. ^ "SBU releases new evidence of Russian Wagner fighters' involvement in war crimes against Ukraine". www.unian.info.
  125. ^ Coynash, Halya (29 August 2017). "Russians admit to killing for money – Ukrainians or Syrians, as Russia demands". Human Rights in Ukraine. Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  126. ^ "Россиянин из ЧВК "Вагнер" рассказал, как готовят боевиков для Луганска и Донецка, - Путину лучше не слышать". Диалог.UA.
  127. ^ "ЧВК Вагнера разоружает бригаду "Одесса" - Voenkor.info". voenkor.info. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  128. ^ "Ukraine's security service: Uncontrolled militant leaders in Donbas eliminated by Russia's Wagner". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  129. ^ a b Goncharova, Olena (17 October 2016). "At least 6 separatist leaders killed in Donbas before Motorola". Kyiv Post. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  130. ^ a b "Luhansk coup attempt continues as rival militia occupies separatist region". 22 November 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  131. ^ "The last days of Aleksey Mozgovoi, rebel hero of the 'Ghost' battalion - killed in an ambush". 24 May 2015. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  132. ^ Volokh, Eugene (2 January 2015). "Batman killed in the Ukraine, allegedly on orders from The Carpenter". Washington Post. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  133. ^ Korrespondent.net. "СБУ: Боевики ЧВК Вагнер поддерживают Корнета". korrespondent.net. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  134. ^ Grove, Thomas (18 December 2015). "Up to Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria, Experts Say". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 23 December 2015.
  135. ^ Fitzpatrick, Catherine A. (21 June 2016). "How Many Russian Soldiers Have Died in Syria?". The Daily Beast. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  136. ^ "How a secret Russian airlift helps Syria's Assad". 9 April 2018. Archived from the original on April 6, 2018 – via af.reuters.com.
  137. ^ a b Rozhdestvensky, Ilya; Bayev, Anton; Rusyayeva, Polina (September 2016). Призраки войны: как в Сирии появилась российская частная армия. RBC (in Russian) (9). Retrieved 25 August 2016.
  138. ^ Parker 2017, p. 6.
  139. ^ "Moscow denies IS captives are Russian soldiers". iReporterOnline. 5 October 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  140. ^ "'Wagner Group': the mercenaries serving Putin in Syria". France 24. 22 March 2018.
  141. ^ a b "After inflicting heavy losses on the regime forces, ISIS restore its stronghold in Hama and the regime desperate to retake Uqayribat". Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 11 September 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  142. ^ "Секретные армии Кремля". charter97.org. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  143. ^ a b c "What losses PMC Wagner suffered in Syria". Fontanka.ru. 22 August 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017 – via RusLetter.
  144. ^ "The Conflict Intelligence Team Versus The Kremlin". Khodorkovsky.com. 4 April 2016. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  145. ^ "Syrian army announces recapture of Palmyra from Islamic State". Reuters. 2 March 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  146. ^ Dearden, Lizzie (2 March 2017). "Isis driven out of ancient Syrian city of Palmyra for second time". The Independent. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  147. ^ Rozin, Igor (7 March 2017). "Mysterious Russian private military group pops up again in media reports". Russia Beyond. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  148. ^ Fadel, Leith (24 April 2017). "ISIS Hunters on the verge of liberating the strategic Al-Sha'er Gas Fields". al-Masdar News. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  149. ^ Fadel, Leith (26 April 2017). "ISIL falls apart in northern Palmyra as Syrian Army troops liberate strategic gas fields". al-Masdar News. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  150. ^ a b McLoughlin, Paul (1 July 2017). "Syrian man filmed being bludgeoned with hammer blows by 'Russian mercenaries'". The New Arab. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
  151. ^ "Al-Sha'er gas field in Homs restarts production". Syrian Arab News Agency. 14 September 2017. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  152. ^ "Наемник ЧВК Вагнера: Половину людей "накрыло" прямо в машинах". charter97.org.
  153. ^ a b "Головорезы (21+)". Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru (in Russian). Retrieved 22 November 2019.
  154. ^ a b Moscow, Marc Bennetts. "Investigators say man filmed beheading Syrian is Russian Wagner Group mercenary". The Times.
  155. ^ "Russian mercenaries 'beat and beheaded Syrian man' in leaked video". 18 November 2019.
  156. ^ "Russian Mercenaries Linked to Gruesome Syrian Torture and Beheading Video". 21 November 2019.
  157. ^ "Man who filmed beheading of Syrian identified as Russian mercenary". 21 November 2019.
  158. ^ a b "Russian Press Names Wagner Mercenary as Likely Perpetrator in Gruesome Syria Beheading". The Moscow Times. 22 April 2020.
  159. ^ "One of the suspected Russian mercenaries who helped torture and execute a man in Syria is now reportedly teaching kids about patriotism in Bryansk". meduza.io. Retrieved 25 November 2019.
  160. ^ "Journalists say Russian mercenaries in Syria tortured, beheaded, and burned a deserter from Assad's army. For fun". meduza.io. Retrieved 22 November 2019.
  161. ^ "Опознаны все 5 российских головорезов из состава ЧВК "Вагнер", жестоко казнившие пленного сирийца в 2017 году". Информационный навигатор (in Russian). 13 December 2019. Retrieved 13 December 2019.
  162. ^ "Головорезы 2.0". Новая газета - Novayagazeta.ru (in Russian). 21 April 2020. Retrieved 23 April 2020.
  163. ^ Russian Paramilitaries Accused of Torture and Beheading in Landmark Legal Case Against Wagner Group
  164. ^ Syria: NGOs file torture case against Russian Wagner fighters
  165. ^ a b "Признание бойца ЧВК Вагнера: "Шойгу приказал отобрать у нас оружие"". ura.news.
  166. ^ "معركة الوجود الأخير يخوضها تنظيم "الدولة الإسلامية" وأكثر من 400 قتيل من قوات النظام والتنظيم خلال أقل من أسبوعين من القتال الطاحن". 15 September 2017.
  167. ^ "Russia touts essential role in Syria's advance against IS". France 24. 18 September 2017.
  168. ^ Fahmy, Omar (3 October 2017). "Islamic State releases video it says shows two Russians captured in Syria". Reuters. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  169. ^ "Kremlin distances itself from captured 'Russian soldiers' in Isis propaganda video". 4 October 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  170. ^ "Media: FSB tells family of Russian prisoner captured by ISIS in Syria not to cause stir". 5 October 2017. Retrieved 5 October 2017.
  171. ^ O'Connor, Tom (5 October 2017). "Syria's 'ISIS Hunters' Offer $1 Million for Russian Hostages". Newsweek. Retrieved 7 October 2017.
  172. ^ 2 Russians Who Refused to Reject Jesus on Camera 'Almost Certainly' Killed by ISIS Christian Post, 6 October 2017.
  173. ^ Депутат Госдумы заявил о возможной казни в Сирии двух якобы плененных россиян Interfax, 5 October 2017.
  174. ^ "Video Glorifying Russian Mercenaries in Syria Trends on YouTube". 25 October 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  175. ^ "Syria declares victory over Islamic State in Deir al-Zor". Reuters. 3 November 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2017.
  176. ^ "Isis dealt twin blows with loss of Deir ez-Zor and key Iraq border post". The Guardian. Agence France-Presse. 3 November 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2017.
  177. ^ "Syrian Army resumes offensive to expel ISIS from large Deir Ezzor island". almasdarnews.com. 11 November 2017. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  178. ^ "Fears for the lives of about 150 citizens in besieged Hawija Katea of being shelled by the regime forces which started to advance towards it through water bridges". 11 November 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  179. ^ "ISIS mass surrenders large Deir Ezzor island, 250+ terrorists captured". AMN News. 17 November 2017. Retrieved 17 November 2017.
  180. ^ "After an undisclosed agreement, the regime forces imposes their control over Hwyjet Katea' and tens of ISIS members surrender, the fate of about 150 civilians in it is unknown". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  181. ^ "Russia negotiating the release of two nationals captured by IS". 1 December 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  182. ^ "+18: Russian-Trained Syrian Unit Eliminates Scores Of ISIS In Black Operation". 4 December 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  183. ^ "В ЧВК "Вагнера" сообщили родителям плененного "ИГ" россиянина о его смерти". tsn.ua. 16 December 2017. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  184. ^ eakin (29 November 2017). "Private military companies: Moscow's other army in Syria". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  185. ^ Vladimir Isachenkov. "Russia's Putin stops at Russian military base in Syria". The Washington Post. AP. Archived from the original on 11 December 2017. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  186. ^ Pukhov, Ruslan (10 December 2017). "Moscow-based think tank director: Russia's unexpected military victory in Syria". defensenews.com. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  187. ^ "Бойцы ЧВК Вагнера помогли освободить населенные пункты на северо-востоке Хамы". Правда.Ру. 5 February 2018.
  188. ^ "The clashes continue in the besieged circle within 3 provinces between the regime forces and their allies against ISIS".
  189. ^ Aboufadel, Leith (7 February 2018). "Syrian Army liberates 80 percent of ISIL's pocket in northeast Hama - map".
  190. ^ "Islamic State fighters move to Syria's Idlib, clash with factions, sources say". Reuters. 9 February 2018.
  191. ^ "Syria says rare US strike an effort 'to support terrorism'".
  192. ^ "U.S. dismisses fears of wider war after deadly Syria clashes". Reuters. 8 February 2018 – via uk.reuters.com.
  193. ^ "Diplomats specify who was killed by an American strike (Дипломаты уточняют, кто погиб от американского удара)". Kommersant. 14 February 2018.
  194. ^ Bergengruen, Vera; Daragahi, Borzou; al-Awad, Munzer (13 February 2018). "Here's What We Know About The US Airstrikes That Killed Russian Fighters In Syria". BuzzFeed. Retrieved 14 February 2018.
  195. ^ a b Barbara Starr; Ryan Browne (7 February 2018). "US-led coalition strikes kill pro-regime forces in Syria". CNN.
  196. ^ Times, The Moscow (9 February 2018). "U.S. Airstrikes Kill 100 Russian and Syrian Fighters, Reports Say". The Moscow Times.
  197. ^ Провальную операцию РФ в Хишаме планировал начальник оперативного отделения ЧВК «Вагнера» Сергей Ким Inform Napalm, 19 February 2018.
  198. ^ Wagner's failed attack on US forces in Syria ‘led by former Russian Marine officer’ Kyiv Post, 19 February 2018.
  199. ^ Aboufadel, Leith (11 February 2018). "Pro-gov't ISIS Hunters release official statement after US airstrikes in Deir Ezzor".
  200. ^ a b Christoph Reuter. American Fury: The Truth About the Russian Deaths in Syria: Hundreds of Russian soldiers are alleged to have died in U.S. airstrikes at the beginning of February. Reporting by DER SPIEGEL shows that events were likely very different. Der Spiegel, 2 March 2018.
  201. ^ Fifteen Russian security staff killed in Syria explosion: The incident at a weapons depot follows the reported deaths of scores of Russian mercenaries in a US-led coalition attack last week The Guardian, 15 February 2018.
  202. ^ a b c "More than 200 Russians may have been killed in Coalition strikes in Syria". 10 February 2018.
  203. ^ "Reports of Russian Deaths Underscore Dangers of Syria's War". U.S. News & World report. 13 February 2018.
  204. ^ "The business of war: Russian mercenaries in Syria". France 24. 23 February 2018. Retrieved 23 February 2018.
  205. ^ a b c d "Russian toll in Syria battle was 300 killed and wounded: sources". Reuters. 16 February 2018.
  206. ^ a b c d "ЧВК "Вагнера" в Сирии и на Донбассее: 40 уничтоженных авиацией США наемников 7 февраля 2018". Цензор.НЕТ.
  207. ^ a b c SBU publishes list of 206 non-TOE employees of the Directorate of General Staff of Russian Army, members of Wagner PMC, plus personal data on eight more killed mercs
    SBU releases personal details of 11 Russian Wagner PMC mercenaries who fought in Donbas separatists’ ranks. PHOTOS
    Hrytsak: “The lie stained with blood, greed and fear for the committed crimes – this is the true face of Russian special services. The situation with the passports of killed mercenaries is a glaring confirmation.”
  208. ^ a b Tim Lister; Mary Ilyushina; Sebastian Shukla. "The oil field carnage that Moscow doesn't want to talk about". CNN.
  209. ^ a b "Названо точное число россиян, погибших в Сирии из-за удара США". vz.ru.
  210. ^ a b c В Сирии погибло 14 человек - руководитель ЧВК "Вагнер" Трошев Андрей Pravda.ru, 17 February 2018.
  211. ^ a b "PMC Wagner chief: 14 were killed in Syria". PravdaReport. 19 February 2018.
  212. ^ "Russia says U.S. airstrike killed 5 of its citizens". CBS News.
  213. ^ "About 220 casualties and wounded of the Russian security companies, the regime forces and their allies in Coalition's bombing and the explosion of a warehouse of the Russian protection forces east of Euphrates". Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
  214. ^ Ryan Browne; Barbara Starr. "Pro-Syrian regime forces building up near US troops in Syria". CNN.
  215. ^ "Вагнера в охрану. Бывший командир рассказал о новом облике ЧВК". Радио Свобода.
  216. ^ "Syrian government air strikes kill 71 and wound 325 in 24 hours, monitor says". Independent. 19 February 2018. Retrieved 20 February 2018.
  217. ^ "Syria forces ready for assault on rebel enclave". France 24. 18 February 2018. Retrieved 20 February 2018.
  218. ^ Jomana Karadsheh, Tamara Qiblawi and Lauren Said-Moorhouse. "Syrian regime forces cut Eastern Ghouta into three parts". CNN. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  219. ^ Syria war: Thousands flee Eastern Ghouta as army advances, BBC News, 15 March 2018
  220. ^ "Fears for the lives of civilians after the regime forces advanced in the southwestern pocket of the Eastern Ghouta under heavy fire cover". SOHR. 17 March 2018.
  221. ^ "Syrian troops cut major roads in suburbs of Damascus". ABC News. Retrieved 12 March 2018.
  222. ^ Barrington, Lisa (23 March 2018). "Syrian army celebrates as rebels quit most of their Ghouta stronghold". Reuters – via www.reuters.com.
  223. ^ "The Latest: Syrian army says it has retaken eastern Ghouta". Ynetnews. 15 April 2018.
  224. ^ "Syrian army declares full control of Eastern Ghouta rebel enclave". Xinhua News Agency.
  225. ^ Aboufadel, Leith (14 April 2018). "East Ghouta officially under the Syrian Army's control after last militant convoy leaves Douma".
  226. ^ "Western airstrikes unlikely to impact Assad's war machine". ABC News. Associated Press.
  227. ^ "Ukraine's SBU identifies chief instructor of Ukrainian unit at Russia's PMC Wagner". www.unian.info.
  228. ^ "СБУ: Мы идентифицировали личности 11 белорусов из ЧВК Вагнера, воевавших в Сирии". TUT.BY. 26 July 2018. Archived from the original on 13 May 2021. Retrieved 30 July 2018.
  229. ^ Аксенов, Илья Барабанов, Андрей Сошников, Анастасия Напалкова, Павел (23 November 2018). "От Африки до Украины. Где воюет "ЧВК Вагнера" и кто построил им церковь". BBC News Russian.
  230. ^ "Syrian government troops launch an offensive against rebels in the country's northwest". Los Angeles Times. 6 May 2019.
  231. ^ "Syrian pro-regime forces renew advance on rebel-held Idlib". Financial Times.
  232. ^ Desk, News (10 May 2019). "Russian special forces take part in northwestern Hama offensive (photos)".
  233. ^ Putin's ‘Chef’ Preps Soldiers for Final Assault on Syrian Rebels, Bloomberg, 6 September 2019
  234. ^ "قوات النظام تبدأ دخول مدينة منبج شمال شرق حلب بالتزامن مع استمرار انسحاب قوات التحالف من المدينة". 15 October 2019.
  235. ^ "U.S. coalition: 'We are out' of Syria's Manbij". Reuters. 15 October 2019.
  236. ^ McKernan, Bethan (15 October 2019). "Russian troops patrol between Turkish and Syrian forces on border". The Guardian.
  237. ^ Bostock, Bill. "Video shows the inside of an abandoned US camp in Syria taken over by Russian mercenaries". Business Insider.
  238. ^ "Fresh Russian-U.S. 'Skirmish' Reported in Syria". The Moscow Times. 27 January 2020.
  239. ^ "U.S. troops block Russian vehicles from reaching Simalka border crossing with northern Iraq". 4 February 2020.
  240. ^ Donati, Jessica (6 February 2020). "U.S. Troops in Standoffs With Russian Military Contractors in Syria". Wall Street Journal.
  241. ^ "Russian military at front-lines in northwestern Syria: photos". Al-Masdar News. 8 February 2020.
  242. ^ a b Russia's Shadowy Mercenaries Offer Humanitarian Aid to Clean Image
  243. ^ Политолог: в Сирии ужесточились бои после вывода ЧВК «Вагнера»
  244. ^ "Kremlin 'Following' Situation In Ukraine's Russia-Backed Separatist-Controlled Luhansk". Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  245. ^ "Luhansk coup attempt continues as rival militia occupies separatist region". Independent. 22 November 2017. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  246. ^ "Power struggle among east Ukraine separatists indicates likely Russian consolidation of increased militia control in Donbass conflict - Jane's 360". www.janes.com. 22 November 2017.
  247. ^ Ukraine rebel region's security minister says he is new leader, Reuters (24 November 2017)
    Separatist Leader In Ukraine's Luhansk Resigns Amid Power Struggle, Radio Free Europe (24 November 2017)
  248. ^ "Захар Прилепин встретил главу ЛНР в самолете в Москву". meduza.io. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  249. ^ Народный совет ЛНР единогласно проголосовал за отставку Плотницкого (in Russian). Retrieved 25 November 2017.
  250. ^ a b "Игорь Гиркин (Стрелков): "К власти и в Донецкой, и в Луганской республике Сурков привел бандитов"". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  251. ^ "Russia's 'valiant hero' in Ukraine turns his fire on Vladimir Putin". The Guardian. 5 June 2016.
  252. ^ Moscow, Julian Borger Marc Bennetts in (13 February 2018). "Scores of Russian mercenaries reportedly killed by US airstrikes in Syria". The Guardian.
  253. ^ "SBU evidence of PMC "Wagner" mercenaries' military crimes are confirmed by militants". sbu.gov.ua.
  254. ^ Ihor Huskov, the Chief of the SBU staff, 8 October 2018 - “As for today, there are the recruitment centers in Donbas, while mostly citizens of Luhansk region come there. Also, we have the information on the place of the current deployment of the small unit from the membership of “Wagner” private military company but it does not surpass a few dozens of people.” According to him, this unit deals with the murder of people in occupied territories who are undesirable by Russia.
  255. ^ "После Сирии российские ЧВК готовы высадиться в Судане". BBC News Русская Служба. 4 December 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  256. ^ Tsvetkova, Maria (13 March 2017). "Exclusive: Russian private security firm says it had armed men in east". Reuters. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  257. ^ "The Libyan army has explained the invitation of the Russian PMCs - FreeNews English - FreeNews-en.tk". freenews-en.tk. Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  258. ^ "Журналист показал "будни российской ЧВК в Судане"". Retrieved 12 December 2017.
  259. ^ a b c Ioanes, Ellen. "These are the countries where Russia's shadowy Wagner Group mercenaries operate". Business Insider.
  260. ^ SBU Head Vasyl Hrytsak: Russian military intelligence units break up democratic protests in Sudan
  261. ^ Tim Lister; Sebastian Shukla; Nima Elbagir (25 April 2019). "A Russian company's secret plan to quell protests in Sudan". CNN.
  262. ^ "В оккупированном Крыму прошел набор людей в ряды ЧВК "Вагнера" – руководитель аппарата СБУ". Интерфакс-Украина.
  263. ^ "Russian private contractors active in Sudan during protest crackdown". Middle East Eye.
  264. ^ Flanagan, Jane. "Russian mercenaries help put down Sudan protests". The Times.
  265. ^ Russian contractors are training the army in Sudan, says Moscow
  266. ^ a b "Hrytsak: "The lie stained with blood, greed and fear for the committed crimes – this is the true face of Russian special services. The situation with the passports of killed mercenaries is a glaring confirmation." :: Security Service of Ukraine". ssu.gov.ua.
  267. ^ "Saudi Arabia announce solidarity for Sudan Al Bashir". gulfnews.com.
  268. ^ "More than 800 detained in ongoing Sudan protests: Minister". Al Jazeera.
  269. ^ "France WARNING: Russian mercenaries PLOTTING in Africa - 'We know you!'". 25 January 2019.
  270. ^ "Moscow's Hand in Sudan's Future". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  271. ^ "Russia reveals deal allowing it to use Sudan ports". Middle East Monitor. 25 May 2019.
  272. ^ "UAWire - Russia signs military deal with Sudan". www.uawire.org.
  273. ^ Sudan to host Russian military bas
  274. ^ Russia plans naval base in Sudan
  275. ^ "Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground". Stratfor. Retrieved 20 January 2018.
  276. ^ "UN arms embargo on the Central African Republic". SIPRI. 2 February 2017. Retrieved 17 February 2018.
  277. ^ Ross, Aaron (17 October 2018). "How Russia moved into Central Africa". Reuters. Retrieved 27 July 2021.
  278. ^ Ответ заместителя директора Департамента информации и печати МИД России А.А.Кожина на вопрос СМИ о развитии сотрудничества между Российской Федерацией и Центральноафриканской Республикой
  279. ^ "Russia provides free military aid to Central African Republic — Foreign Ministry". TASS.
  280. ^ a b "Foreign mercenaries in new scramble for Africa and the Sahel". Middle East Eye.
  281. ^ a b "Как Россия подвергает своему влиянию кризисные страны Африки". www.inopressa.ru.
  282. ^ a b Losh, Jack (9 August 2018). "'Battle for Africa': Russia pushes into 'free country for the taking' in attempt to rival the West". Newsweek. |first2= missing |last2= (help)
  283. ^ Leviev, Ruslan. "Российское присутствие в Центральноафриканской республике — Conflict Intelligence Team".
  284. ^ a b c Luhn, Alec (1 August 2018). "Russian journalists killed in Central African Republic while investigating mercenaries of 'Putin's chef'". The Telegraph – via www.telegraph.co.uk.
  285. ^ "How Russia Is Displacing the French in the Struggle for Influence in the Central African Republic". Jamestown Foundation.
  286. ^ a b Walsh, Declan (27 June 2021). "Russian Mercenaries Are Driving War Crimes in Africa, U.N. Says". The New York Times. Retrieved 27 July 2021.
  287. ^ "Russian Journalists Murdered in Africa -- What Russia Does Not Say". POLYGRAPH.info.
  288. ^ a b c Who is Konstantin Pikalov, suspected of being the "Mr. Africa" of the paramilitary group Wagner?
  289. ^ "Moscow signs military co-operation pact with CAR". News24. 21 August 2018.
  290. ^ "France warns on Russian arms and advisers in Central African Republic". Telegraph. 29 October 2018. Retrieved 28 January 2019.
  291. ^ Nicholas Haque (15 November 2018). "Central African Republic calls on Russia to train its army". Al Jazeera.
  292. ^ ""Covert activity of Russian mercenaries of Wagner's PMC in CAR should be subject of international investigation," says SBU Head Vasyl Hrytsak :: Security Service of Ukraine". ssu.gov.ua.
  293. ^ As Sudan hosts CAR peace talks, Russia offers to get more involved
  294. ^ "UAWire - Ukrainian Security Service: Russian private military company Wagner active in Syria and Sudan". uawire.org.
  295. ^ Rebels seize Central African Republic's fourth-largest city five days before nationwide elections, France 24, 22 December 2020
  296. ^ CAR rebels seize Bambari city, Russia confirms sending military
  297. ^ Russia sends 300 military instructors to Central African Republic, BBC News
  298. ^ Российские наемники начали помогать армии ЦАР на фоне тяжелых боев
  299. ^ UN says seized C.African town under peacekeepers' control
  300. ^ C. Africa govt forces retake key town from rebels
  301. ^ C.Africa pro-government forces retake strategic town: spokesman
  302. ^ Russian advisor in C.Africa urges rebels to turn in their leaders
  303. ^ C. Africa forces seize Bozize stronghold: government
  304. ^ a b Бойцов ЧВК Вагнера убили в ЦАР
  305. ^ RCA : la sous-préfecture de Aba( nord-ouest) reprise par l’armée nationale et ses alliés
  306. ^ RCA : après la ville de Kaga-Bandoro, c’est le tour de Batangafo d’être reprise par l’armée nationale
  307. ^ RCA : la ville de Kabo, dans l’Ouham-Fafa, est reprise par l’armée nationale et ses alliés
  308. ^ RCA : la ville de Markounda, dans l’Ouham, est reprise par l’armée nationale et ses alliés
  309. ^ RCA : reprise de la ville de Kémbé, mais aussi de Dimbi, de Poumbolo et de Gambo par les forces loyalistes
  310. ^ Tension Grows In Central African Republic As FACA Soldiers Kill Unarmed Rebel
  311. ^ Centrafrique: l’armée et ses alliés reprennent la ville stratégique de Kaga-Bandoro
  312. ^ RCA: la ville de Bakoum désormais sous contrôle des FACA et leurs alliés
  313. ^ RCA : détonations d’armes à Alindao, les mercenaires russes affrontent les rebelles de la CPC
  314. ^ RCA : retour des mercenaires russes à Mbrés, les rebelles ont disparu
  315. ^ a b RCA : les mercenaires russes et syriens ont repris la ville de Yalinga sans affrontement
  316. ^ Russian Mercenaries Recapture Nzako Town In Central African Republic
  317. ^ RCA : violent combat entre les mercenaires russes et les rebelles de l’UPC au village Boyo, une vingtaine des morts
  318. ^ Bria, trois rebelles de la CPC tué par les mercenaires russes au village Bongou
  319. ^ Russia/Africa: Wagner, an investigation into Putin’s mercenaries
  320. ^ UN concerned over Russian mercenaries in CAR
  321. ^ Central African troops and Russian mercenaries accused of abuses in anti-rebel offensive
  322. ^ C.Africa to Probe Claims of Abuse By Troops, Russian Forces, The Moscow Times, 5 May 2021
  323. ^ Russia insists CAfrica 'instructors' are unarmed, France 24
  324. ^ Chad accuses Central African Republic of 'war crime' after attack on outpost
  325. ^ RCA : violent accrochage ce dimanche entre l’armée tchadienne et les mercenaires de Wagner à la frontière
  326. ^ Walsh, Declan (27 June 2021). "Russian Mercenaries Are Driving War Crimes in Africa". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 July 2021.
  327. ^ UN urges CAR to cut ties with Russia's Wagner mercenaries over rights abuses
  328. ^ Russian mercenaries using EU-trained soldiers in Africa
  329. ^ "Master and Chef: Prigozhin and Madagascar". Проект. 14 March 2019.
  330. ^ "MADAGASCAR : Russians muscle in on chrome industry - 23/11/2018 - The Indian Ocean Newsletter". Africa Intelligence. 23 November 2018.
  331. ^ The Sun: Russia sends troops and missiles to east Libya and sets up two military bases The Libya Observer
  332. ^ Luhn, Alec; Nicholls, Dominic (3 March 2019). "Russian mercenaries back Libyan rebel leader as Moscow seeks influence in Africa". The Telegraph – via www.telegraph.co.uk.
  333. ^ Libyan National Army Advances Reclaiming Al Shararah Oilfield, 8 February 2019
  334. ^ Al-Warfalli, Ayman (28 January 2019). "Eastern Libya government delegation visits key southern city of Sabha". Reuters – via www.reuters.com.
  335. ^ "Libya's Khalifa Haftar says NLA has taken largest oil field". The National.
  336. ^ "Haftar Troops Advance in South Libya, Putting GNA Under Pressure". Asharq Al-Awsat.
  337. ^ "Libya: LNA Says in Control of Southern Border Areas". Asharq Al-Awsat.
  338. ^ "Spokesman: Libyan Strongman's Forces Control South". Voice of America news.
  339. ^ Irish, Ulf Laessing (15 April 2019). "Libya offensive stalls, but Haftar digs in given foreign sympathies". Reuters.
  340. ^ TV (9 September 2019). "#BreakingNews: 7 Russian mercenaries have been killed in an airstrike by Burkan Al-Ghadab operation forces under #GNA's command against #Haftar's militias in Qasir Benghashir in southern #Tripoli, says commander of Control Room of Anti-terrorism Force Ali Abu Zayan".
  341. ^ "Foreign mercenaries fighting alongside Haftar's forces killed in airstrikes in southern Tripoli | The Libya Observer". Libya Observer.
  342. ^ "Libya: A #LNA senior leader and 3 #Russian mercenaries killed during #airstrikes in #Sabha and #AlAziziya, sources close to the #Tripoli government report". 24 September 2019.
  343. ^ Moscow, Marc Bennetts. "Airstrike kills 'Kremlin mercenaries' backing Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar". The Times.
  344. ^ "Senior commander in Russian Wagner Group injured in Libya, French Le Point reports". The Libya Observer.
  345. ^ a b Tsvetkova, Maria (7 January 2020). "Exclusive: Russian clinic treated mercenaries injured in secret wars". Reuters.
  346. ^ "Russia's PMC Wagner leaves a trail of personal belongings in Libya". The Defense Post. 26 September 2019.
  347. ^ Journal, Raja Abdulrahim | Photographs by André Liohn for The Wall Street (1 October 2019). "Foreign Backing Brings Militias in Libya to a Stalemate—and No Further". Wall Street Journal.
  348. ^ Kirkpatrick, David D. (5 November 2019). "Russian Snipers, Missiles and Warplanes Try to Tilt Libyan War". The New York Times.
  349. ^ "Arrival of Russian mercenaries adds deadlier firepower, modern tactics to Libya's civil war". Washington Post.
  350. ^ Wehrey, Frederic. "With the Help of Russian Fighters, Libya's Haftar Could Take Tripoli".
  351. ^ a b c d "From Tripoli's front lines: How Haftar recovered from the setback in Gharyan and what's next for the advancing LNA".
  352. ^ Kirkpatrick, David D. (5 November 2019). "Russian Snipers, Missiles and Warplanes Try to Tilt Libyan War - The New York Times". The New York Times.
  353. ^ a b US Africa Command: Russian mercenaries planted land mines in Libya
  354. ^ a b Libya Fighting Rages Near Tripoli in Push By Hifter's Forces
  355. ^ a b c "Russian mercenaries spearhead the battle for Libya's capital". South China Morning Post. 22 December 2019.
  356. ^ Russian mercenaries in Libya: 'They sprayed us with bullets'
  357. ^ "Facebook says it suspended Russian disinformation campaign targeting Africa". France 24. 30 October 2019.
  358. ^ "Facebook suspends Russia-linked accounts for meddling in Africa". Al Jazeera.
  359. ^ "Russians arrested as spies in Libya worked for Russian firm Wagner, official says". Washington Post.
  360. ^ Libya Uncovers Alleged Russian Plot to Meddle in African Votes
  361. ^ Al-Atrush, Samer (21 March 2020). "How a Russian plan to restore Gadhafi's regime in Libya backfired". The Japan Times.
  362. ^ Detsch, Jack (18 November 2019). "Congress moves to sanction Russians for mercenary surge in Libya". Al-Monitor.
  363. ^ a b U.S. Warns Against Russia's Growing Role in Libya War
  364. ^ Press, Maggie Michael, The Associated (5 December 2019). "Russian mercenaries backing militia commander trying to capture Tripoli, Libya and US officials say". Military Times.
  365. ^ Kington, Tom (20 November 2019). "Italy confirms military drone crashed in Libya". Defense News.
  366. ^ "Pro-Haftar forces in Libya 'shoot down Italian drone'". Times of Malta.
  367. ^ "US military loses drone over Libyan capital". AP NEWS. 23 November 2019.
  368. ^ "Libyan Officials Say US Drone Shot Down by Mistake".
  369. ^ Lewis, Phil Stewart (7 December 2019). "Exclusive: U.S. says drone shot down by Russian air defenses near Libyan capital". Reuters.